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Antitrust policy and health 
care reform
BY JOHN J. FLYNN*
I. Introduction ,
Among the economic and political challenges facing the United 
States today, none is more significant— yet difficult to resolve—  
than the complex puzzle of how to reform the delivery of health 
care services. A  consensus appears to have been reached that 
reform should extend health care coverage to all Americans, while 
restraining the growth of costs, maintaining the quality of care and 
continuing the high level of innovation in the industry. Although 
the estimates vary, the American health care system is claimed to 
cost in excess o f $800 billion per year, over 14% of the gross
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national product.1 Between 35- and 37-million Americans are esti­
mated to be without health care insurance at one time or another 
during a calendar year and employers and governments labor under 
a growing burden to pay for the health care benefits they under­
write and their employees expect.2 Inflation in health care costs 
has been constant and excessive, while efforts to restrain inflation 
have been sporadic and ad hoc rather than consistent and compre­
hensive. In view of these facts, it is surprising that it has taken so 
long to arrive at a consensus for fundamental reform.
Many o f the proposals for reform now being proposed would 
sanction joint conduct and levels of cooperation between competi­
tors in health care that have often been questioned or condemned 
under the antitrust laws in other contexts and levels o f govern­
ment intervention and regulation that pose complex issues con­
cerning the relation of antitrust policy to the regulation imposed. 
Other proposals contemplate a relaxation of antitrust standards for 
health care activities without explaining how the public interest in 
fair and efficient resource allocation at reasonable prices is to be 
achieved absent antitrust enforcement or affirmative government
1 See Hilary Stout, Delicate Decisions, W all  St. J., Apr. 22, 1993, 
§ A, at 1, col. 1. See also V. R. Fuchs, The Health Care System’s Share 
of the Gross National Product, 247 Sciences 534-38 (1990).
2 See Paul B. Ginsburg, Alternative Approaches to Health Care 
Cost Containment, 30 Jurimetrics J. 447, 448 (1990) (reporting that in 
1988, employer contributions to health insurance equaled almost 5% of 
total compensation and that U.S. health care spending is 38% higher than 
in Canada and 85% and 87% higher than in France and West Germany 
respectively). 57 C onsumer Rep. 435, 436 (July 1992) reported that in 
1960 the United States spent 5.3% of GNP on health care. In 1992 it esti­
mated that the United States spent 14% of GNP on health care; that 16% 
of state and local budgets are spent on health care; that three of four busi­
nesses with ten or fewer employees did not provide health care benefits 
for employees; and the health care costs of businesses that must compete 
on world markets far exceed those of their foreign competitors. Estimates 
of the number of uninsured range from 13%-15% and the “woefully” 
underinsured at 13% of the total population. See Robert M. Veatch, 
Physicians and Cost Containment: The Ethical Conflict, 30 Jurimetrics J. 
461,462(1990).
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rate and service regulation. Still other proposals contemplate a 
single payor system without spelling out how rates for specific 
services are to be established, what role competition policy should 
play in such a system, and how limited resources are to be 
rationed among competing demands while maintaining quality 
and incentives for innovation. Little attention has been giv^n the 
question of the role o f antitrust policy in the reform of health care 
financing and the delivery o f health care services in pending leg­
islative reform proposals.
As discussion of health care reform and distribution o f health 
care resources has escalated in the early 1990s, the status of 
antitrust policy as a central premise of government economic and 
regulatory enforcement appears to be reemerging from the liber­
tarian days ot nonenforcement of the 1980s. Ever since the adop­
tion o f the Sherman Act in 1890, explicit reliance upon antitrust 
policy as the basic organizing principle for our economy has 
waxed and waned. Eras o f a laissez-faire enforcement policy are 
usually— but not always— followed by periods of activist antitrust 
enforcement as a remedy for the excesses o f markets and govern­
mental regulatory schemes not subject to meaningful antitrust 
scrutiny.3 On occasion, economic crises like that which prevailed 
during the Great Depression, cause government to flirt with econ­
omy-wide regulatory alternatives, such as cartelization o f the
3 Louis B. Schwartz has aptly observed: “There is relatively little 
useful predictive value in the cycle theory of antitrust. The regularities 
we perceive are largely subjective projections. There is some synchronic- 
ity with major politicoeconomic trends, but who can predict those with 
any reliability? The waves of antitrust zeal are composites of many ideo­
logical oscillations: federalism vs. states’ fights, business vs. political 
leadership, judicial supremacy vs. executive arid legislative powers, judi­
cial acti^sm vs. deference to administrative decisions, respect for jury 
trial etc. Moreover, there-are no ‘ leading indicators’ such as those some­
times relied on with notorious fallibility of financial forecasters. The 
periods of the antitrust pendulum and the interrelated political pendulum 
differ from each other and each is quite variable.” Louis B. Schwartz, 
Cycles o f Antitrust Zeal: Predictability?, 35 A ntitrust B ull . 771, 799 
(1990).
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economy, on the assumption that reliance upon a government- 
enforced policy o f a competitive process can no longer work in a 
complex modern society. On other occasions, most notably over 
the past two decades, reliance upon government-enforced antitrust 
policy has been undermined by an ideology hostile to government 
interference in the functioning of markets presumed to be gov­
erned by the invisible hand of perfect competition, the reality of 
particular cases to the contrary notwithstanding.4 It is an ideology 
that gained the upper hand in the academy, the judiciary, and the 
executive branch of the federal government in the 1980s.5 Some 
consequences o f that hostility include the fact that the staff of the 
Antitrust Division was cut nearly in half during the Reagan
4 The most extreme judicial exercise of applying the neoclassical 
model without regard to the facts of an individual case during the 1980s 
was Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574 (1986), approving the grant of summary judgment on the 
grounds that the plaintiff’s claim of predatory pricing was “ implausi­
ble”— with plausibility determined by the dictates of the neoclassical 
model rather than the facts of the case. For a factual critique of the deci­
sion, see Steven F. Bene, Below-Cost Sales and the Buying o f Market 
Share, 42 Stan . L. Rev . 695 (1990). For a critique of the Court’s method­
ology see John J. Flynn, An Antitrust Allegory, 38 H astings L. Rev . 517 
(1987).
The Court’s simplistic positivism in Matsushita, has been placed in 
question by Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 
S. Ct. 2072 (1992) stressing the need to have a trial of the facts and cir­
cumstances of antitrust cases rather than summarily dismiss a case on the 
basis o f the predictions of an economic model of what might happen in a 
world abiding by the unrealistic factual assumptions behind the model. 
The Kodak case, however, has been followed by Brooke Group Ltd. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993), where the 
majority employed Matsushita's “plausibility” standard, 113 S. Ct. at 
2590, to justify an extensive review of a jury’s finding of fact and uphold 
the trial court’s reversal of the jury’s finding of a violation of the Robin- 
son-Patman Act in a predatory pricing case,
5 See John J. Flynn, Legal Reasoning, Antitrust Policy and the 
Social Science o f Economics, 33 A ntitrust Bull . 713 (1988); Frederick 
M. Rowe, The Decline o f Economics and the Delusions of Models: The 
Faustian Pact o f Law and Economics, 72 Geo. L.J. 1511 (1984).
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years,6 private antitrust enforcement actions suffered a noticeable 
decline during the 1980s7 and markets like health care not con­
forming to the two-dimensional model of perfectly competitive 
neoclassical markets were generally ignored by government 
enforcement officials and policymakers devoted to promoting the 
libertarian political ideology o f the neoclassical model.8
6 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1300, at 157 (Jan. 29,
1987). Even the A B A ’s Antitrust Section recognized that the staff and 
budget cuts of the 1980s “had an adverse effect on antitrust enforce­
ment.” Report of the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Asso­
ciation, Task Force Report on Competition Policy, 64 ATTR (BNA) No. 
1604, at 1 (Spec. Supp., Mar. 4,1993).
7 In the decades of the 1970s, over 1000 private actions were filed 
annually. See John E. McClatchey, Introduction: Private Enforcement in 
the New Antitrust Era, 58 A ntitrust L.J. 271, 272 (1989). In 1977, 1611 
private cases were filed. Id. Ten years later, in 1987, a total of 758 pri­
vate cases were filed. Id. See also Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, 
Economic Analysis o f Private Antitrust Litigation, 14 G eo . L.J. 1001 
(1986). It is possible, but highly improbable, that the private sector 
became far more law abiding in the go-go 1980s than in prior years. It is 
also possible that the cow did, in fact, jump over the moon. ,
8 The appeal of this form of law and economics analysis to law pro­
fessors is thoughtfully explored by Mark Cooney in Why Is Economic 
Analysis So Appealing to Law Professors?, 45 St a n . L. Re v . 2211 
(1993). Among other reasons, Professor Cooney (a lawyer-sociologist) 
concludes that adoption of economic analysis of legal problems enables 
legal scholars to “ embrace science without undertaking empirical investi­
gation.” Id. at 2229. Cooney aljso observes that “ the greater the commit­
ment to investigating the facts o f l^gal behavior, the less dominant 
economic analysis is likely to be.” /«£ at 2230. The difficulty with an 
exclusive reliance upon economic analysis, at least those forms of eco­
nomic analysis emphasizing a rigid deductive use of a model to deter­
mine both fact and law, is that it shuts off an intense empirical analysis of 
facts inconsistent with the assumptions of the model as in the Matsushita 
case or it confines empirical analysis to understandings o f only those 
facts consistent with the model as in the Brooke Group case. Legal analy­
sis requires a constant reexamination of the rules found relevant in light 
of the facts of the dispute before the Court as, in the Kodak decision, 
supra note 4.
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The 1992 election has generated an interesting confluence of 
change— change in the emphasis that will be placed on antitrust 
enforcement to regulate the economy and change in the political 
concern with the legal and economic regime governing the deliv­
ery of health care services. Whether these two developments will 
take place in harmony or in conflict is, however, unclear. It shall 
be the purpose o f this article: 1. To examine case law develop­
ments over the past decade in applying antitrust policy to health 
care markets; and 2. To suggest how antitrust policy as it 
presently stands relates to legislative proposals for reform of
health care markets.
' «*, ■ •
II. Recent antitrust litigation in health care
A. The current status o f antitrust doctrine
Despite oscillations in ardor for antitrust policy and its 
enforcement, certain fundamental doctrines endure through one 
analytical fad and the next to be applied to activities not previ­
ously subjected to consistent antitrust enforcement like health 
care.9 For example, antitrust policy is assumed to be the basic 
organizing principle for the economy of a democratic society rely­
ing primarily upon government defined and enforced private own­
ership o f property and contract rights to allocate resources, 
distribute wealth, set prices, reward efficiency, and stimulate 
innovation.10 Justice Black’s description o f the Sherman Act as “a 
comprehensive charter o f economic liberty . . .  providing an 
environment conducive to the preservation o f our democratic 
political and social institutions” 11 is a recognition of the deeper 
normative reasons for establishing a competitive process as the 
presumed method for organizing our economic affairs in the
9 See Rowe, supra note 5.
10 See John J. Flynn, The Chicken and the Egg, in Fundamentals of 
the Economic Role of G overnment 69 (W. Samuels ed., 1989).
11 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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absence o f a clear legislative statement to the contrary.12 The 
meaning and scope of federal legislation imposing some degree of 
regulation on an industry, including health care,13 is still deter­
mined by courts in light o f an assumption that antitrust policy is 
presumed to apply to the activity in question unless, the conduct is 
expressly exempted or. an intent to exempt can bet divined from 
the regulatory scheme imposed.14-Similarly, as the Supreme Court
12 Recognition of the need to establish antitrust policy as the sine 
qua non or primus inter pares of a democratic society’s economic policy 
is being reaffirmed by nations newly emerging from a Marxist tradition. 
Many of these nations adopted antitrust laws as one of their first steps 
toward economic liberalization as an indispensable ingredient of privatiz- 
ating property ownership and establishing a system of private contract­
ing. Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and the fdrmer Czechoslovakia have all 
recently adopted antitrust laws ^recognition of the necessary connection 
between establishing a private enterprise-based economy and the need to 
protect the economic liberty of the state, people and businesses in that 
economy from private aggregations of power that displace a competitive 
process determining economic success arid failure and a political process 
protecting individual liberty and equality of access to economic opportu­
nity. Asian nations like Korea and Taiwan, with the tradition of wedding 
private economic power with the political power of the state, have also 
recently adopted antitrust laws as a necessary step toward economic lib­
eralization and political democratization. Japan, whose original antitrust 
laws, like those of Germany, were adopted under the pressure o f U.S. 
occupation authorities as a jnecessary step to foreclosing the reestablish­
ment of a fascist state, has substantially increased its antitrust enforce­
ment in recent years. See Harry First, Three Cheers for Antitrust (1993) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file witl^£be author).
13 The Supreme Court upheld the application of the Sherman Act to 
health care 50 years ago in American Medical Association v. United 
States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), discussed infra note 34 and accompanying 
text.
14 The doctrines of express and implied exemptions from antitrust 
policy, arid the related concept of “primary jurisdiction,” are reviewed in 
Louis B. Schwartz et a l ., Free Enterprise and Economic Organization: 
A ntitrust 800, et seq. (6th ed. 1983); see also Louis B. Schwartz, Legal 
Restrictions o f Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of 
Judicial Responsibility, 67 Harv. L. Rev . 436 (1954); Robert S. Balter & 
Christian C. Day, Implied Antitrust Repeals: Principles for Analysis, 86
66 : The antitrust bulletin
recently reasserted in FTC  v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.,15 before 
principles of federalism may be held to oust federal antitrust juris­
diction over activity subject to some level o f state regulation, it 
must be shown that the anticompetitive conduct in question is 
specifically authorized and affirmatively regulated by independent 
state authority.16 The Court majority in Ticor was reaffirming a 
long-standing political value o f antitrust policy important to 
health care reform proposals: the presumption that antitrust policy 
applies to all economic activity in society unless otherwise 
exempted by the Congress or state governments; and, in the case 
of state governments, the conduct in question must be specifically 
exempted and independently and objectively regulated by the
D ickinson L. Rev . 447 (1982). One of the more careful and significant 
recent applications of this fundamental principle may be found in -Judge 
Greene’s opinion finding that Congres$ had not committed exclusive reg­
ulation of AT&T to the FCC and therefore, the government’ s antitrust 
suit seeking to break up AT&T could proceed. United States v. American 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F. Supp. 1314,1320-30 (D.D.C. 1978).
The principle has been maintained in analyzing the effect of regula­
tory action in the health care field. See, e.g., National Gerimedical Hosp.
& Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378 (1981) (holding that 
Blue Cross’ refusal to deal is not immune from antitrust review because 
of failure of plaintiff hospital to secure approval of construction under 
the National Health Planning & Resources Development Act of 1974, 42 
U.S.C. § 3001, et seq.).
15 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992).
16 112 S. Ct. at 2175. The question presented in Ticor was what is 
required by way of “ active supervision” for a state regulatory regime to 
be found to be adequate to displice the presumed application of antitrust 
policy. Beginning with the assumption that “ [t]he preservation of the free 
market and of a system of free enterprise without price fixing or cartels is 
essential to economic freedom,” 112 S. Ct. at 2176, the Court held that 
there must be sufficient state involvement and supervision to insure that 
the anticompetitive policies or programs adopted are those of the state 
and not those of the private interests involved. Simply authorizing the 
anticompetitive conduct or having in place an authority with the power to 
supervise was found not to be enough. See also California Retail Liquor 
Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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state before an exemption from federal antitrust policy m il be 
recognized by the judiciary.17
‘ ■ ' ' j 
Other fundamental principles have either reemerged or  ^some­
times and surprisingly, not been ignored during the past two 
decades. For example, the inherent obligation of legal reasoning 
to analyze the reality of disputes in the context o f the industry and 
circumstances presented with a due regard for the constitutional 
right to a jury trial, placed in great jeopardy by the simplistic pos­
itivism o f Matsushita E lectric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp.,1* reemerged in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv­
ices, Inc.19 The Court in Eastman Kodak required the analysis of 
the reality of the dispute in the circumstances unique to the dis-j 
pute before it could be concluded that antitrust policy had not
*7 Anticompetitive conduct Ingaged in by local governments pur­
suant to express grants of regulatory authority from th& state, need not be 
subject to active state supervision for immunity to obtain under the pre- 
Ticor decision, City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., I l l  
S. Ct. 1344 (1991). Although the opinion is a confused and poorly writ­
ten one, it could be rationalized on the grounds that the remedy for an 
anticompetitive misuse of the delegated state regulatory power by a local 
governmental entity lies with the local electorate or, if the misuse is a 
product of corruption, with traditional criminal law sanctions for corrup­
tion. It could have been held, as the dissenters argued, that local govern­
ments should be required to meet the “ active state supervision” 
requirement for anticompetitive conduct before immunity is obtained. 
The risk of locally authorized anticompetitive conduct escaping control 
by antitrust policy or independent regulatory authority can be significant 
and of long-term damage to the political system as well as the economic 
one. It is not possible to reconcile City o f Columbia with the holdings of 
Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 
(1982), and the policy underlying Ticor’s holding that active supervision 
is required for immunity of conduct under state regulatory programs 
except by claiming that state supervision of the local government’s 
supervision of anticompetitive conduct is sufficient. While it is possible 
that state supervision of the local supervision may be sufficient, it should 
only be found to be sufficient where the supervision is “ active.”
18 475 U.S. 574 (1986). v
19 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
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been violated and the plaintiffs could be summarily denied their 
right to a trial of the facts.20 An important principle o f legal and 
every other form of inductive analysis was being reasserted after 
flirting with the method of simplistic positivism followed in Mat­
sushita: that the relevance, meaning, and applicability o f the facts 
of a dispute and the law governing a dispute, must be analyzed in 
light o f each other and the normative goals underlying antitrust 
policy and the particular and general consequences of the decision 
made.21 Eastman Kodak’s insistence that rules be interpreted and 
applied in light of the facts unique to the dispute, is a demand of
20 Companies supplying service for Kodak photocopy and micro­
graphic equipment claimed that Kodak engaged in a pattern of conduct 
unlawfully excluding them from the service markets for Kodak machines 
by adopting a policy of selling parts only to customers who either 
repaired their own equipment or took service from Kodak, agreeing with 
Kodak parts manufacturers that they would only sell parts for Kodak 
machines to Kodak and engaging in eliminating the market for used 
Kodak equipment in order to eliminate a secondhand market for parts. 
Kodak claimed it was “ implausible” to argue it had power to impose a 
tying arrangement because it lacked power “in the parts market and it was 
“ implausible” that it could monopolize the service market because it 
lacked monopoly power in the equipment and parts markets. The Justice 
Department supported Kodak and argued further that Kodak’s pricing 
strategy should be presumed to be a valid competitive strategy 'of pricing 
the equipmeiit market low and the parts and service market high, thereby 
spreading the cost of the equipment over the lifetime of the equipment. 
And, that it should be presumed that competition from other suppliers of 
equipment would constrain any conduct by Kodak restraining trade.
The Court refused to be seduced into a methodology that sought to 
conform the facts of the case to t|ie predictions of a model premised upon 
assumptions that may or may not equate with the reality of the case. The 
Court reversed for a more extensive examination of the circumstances 
unique to the case, the reality o f consumer knowledge and ability to 
obtain it and proof of justifications Kodak offered for its conduct.
21 Matsushita’s summary judgment standard may not have been sig­
nificantly altered by Kodak after all in view of the Court’s opinion in 
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 
2578 (1993) sustaining a judgment NOV in a Robinson-Patman Act case 
on the ground that the jury verdict was based on findings of fact that 
were not “plausible.”
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legal reasoning that should have particular force in the analysis of 
health care antitrust disputes in light o f the unique characteristics 
of health care financing and methods for delivering the service.
Other basic principles of particular relevance to the regulation 
of health care continue to have vitality : that concepts like relevant 
markets are analytical means to the end o f determining whether 
the policy of the law has been violated, not objectively definable 
ends unto themselves;22 that the central concern of section 2 o f the 
Sherman Act is a qualitative one as well as a quantitative one—  
the control o f economic power displacing a competitive process 
determining success or failure in the marketplace;23 that “ a combi­
22 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 
585 (1985). The Eastman Kodak case also reasserted the role of market 
analysis as a means to the end o f  determining whether the policy of the 
law was violated in the circumstances of the case by treating the markets 
involved as those for service and replacement parts for Kodak machines- 
despite Kodak’s argument that it lacked power in the general equipment 
market. The Court observed: “Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic 
distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally disfavored in 
antitrust law. This Court has preferred to resolve antitrust claims on a 
case-by-case basis, focusing on the ‘ particular facts disclosed by the 
record.’ . . .  In determining the existence of market power, and specifi­
cally the ‘ responsiveness of the sales of one product to price changes of 
the other’ . . . this Court has examined closely the economic reality 
of the market at issue.” Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 
112 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1992).
23 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 
(1985). The Court may have taken a step back from a qualitative 
approach to § 2 in Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 884 
(1993) in favor of a quantitative test. That case involved the Ninth Cir­
cuit’ s approach to the “attempt to monopolize” prohibition and whether 
one must prove a dangerous probability of gaining a monopoly over a 
market before being held to have committed the offense of an unlawful 
attempt to monopolize. The Supreme Court held “ yes” and required proof 
of a dangerous probability of gaining a monopoly of the markets defined. 
The opinion converts the “ attempt to monopolize” offense into one o f 
attempting to gain a “monopoly,” rather than attempting to “ monopo­
lize.” The decision converts the offense from a behavioral offense into a 
structural one despite the literal meaning of the statutory language pro­
hibiting unilateral conduct fixing prices or excluding competition the
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nation formed for the purpose and with the effect o f raising, 
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing” prices remains “ illegal 
per se” ;24 that horizontal territorial and customers divisions con­
tinue to be per se illegal;25 that the regime of a competitive proc­
ess determining market entry and price may not be displaced by 
the privately determined ethical codes o f professions claiming to 
follow some higher calling and claiming to be motivated solely by 
quality of care considerations;26 that horizontal boycotts seeking 
to fix prices or exclude competitors are per se illegal even where 
there may be socially desirable ends or other justifications for the 
joint conduct;27 that vertical price fixing, maximum as well as 
minimum, remains per se illegal;28 that tying arrangements remain
Ninth Circuit’ s Lessig test, Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 
(9th Cir. 1964), cert, denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1965).
24 Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990) (quoting 
and relying upon, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 
150,223(1940)). ,
25 Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (quoting with 
approval, United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)).
26 National Soc’y of Professional Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 
679 (1978); FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Bal­
lard v. Blue Shield of S.W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976), cert, 
denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977). See generally, Thomas L. Greaney, Quality 
of Care and Market Failure Defenses in Antitrust Health Care Litigation^ 
21 Conn. L. R ev. 605 (1989).
27 FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
This case reaffirms a basic principle of antitrust policy, but raises ques­
tions about the wisdom of the allocation of FTC enforcement resources 
during the Reagan-Bush years. While it may have been politically satis­
fying for libertarians to seek to enjoin publicly funded lawyers represent­
ing indigents from striking the government of the District of Columbia to 
increase their wages to $35 an hour, one wonders if there were not more 
pressing matters for the FTC to pursue with its limited resources. It 
appears to be a case reaffirming Anatole France’ s observation: “The 
majestic egalitarianism of the law, which forbids rich and poor alike to 
sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.” Le L ys 
Rouge ch. 7 (1894). t
28 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 496 U.S. 325 
(1990); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc’ y, 457 U.S. 332 
(1982).
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illegal where the seller has “ appreciable economic power” in the 
tying product and the arrangement affects a substantial volume of 
commerce in the tied market;29 that legitimate objectives of joint 
ventures necessary to produce a product must follow the least 
restrictive alternative to that end when doing so;30 and, that denial 
of market access to a single competitor by means that displace the 
competitive process determining market access, the controversial 
K lo r ’s rule, remains per se unlawful whether done by collabora­
tion,31 or by the unilateral exercise o f monopoly power.32 These 
are the fundamental policies and rules of antitrust law that have 
not only survived but have been reaffirmed by the courts during 
the past several years of judicial and executive branch skepticism 
about the need for antitrust enforcement; and, they are central 
principles and rules that should shape the alternatives considered 
in government’s coming response to malfunctions in health care
markets and the financing of health care.
' . - '  ■ t» ■
B. Health care antitrust issues
The continuing vitality of antitrust policy and its fundamental 
role as the presumed method for ordering otherwise unregulated 
economic activity, even during the Reagan-Bush years, is well 
demonstrated by the significant recent antitrust activity relating to 
the health care industry. As one particularly thoughtful observer 
has stated, “ antitrust litigation helped remove a complex set of
29 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 
2072 (1992).
30 National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S.
85 (1984).
31 Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991); Klor’ s, 
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
32 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 
(1985).
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firewalls that had for many years shielded health care providers 
from market discipline.”33
Fifty years ago the Supreme Court held that the antitrust laws 
are fully applicable to the practice o f medicine and the delivery of 
health care services. In American Medical Association v. United 
States,34 the United States Supreme Court upheld a Sherman Act 
criminal indictment and conviction o f the American Medical 
Association, the Medical Society of the District of Columbia, and 
others for obstructing the operations of a nonprofit group health 
plan in the District of Columbia offering prepaid health care serv­
ices. The indictment charged the defendants with conspiring to 
prevent physicians from accepting employment with the group 
health plan and preventing hospitals from providing facilities to 
patients o f doctors practicing in the employment o f the group 
health plan. The Supreme Court held: (1) the practice of medicine 
to be “ trade” under the Sherman Act, (2) that the defendants’ con­
duct was shown to have “ restrained” trade within the meaning of 
the Sherman Act, and (3) that the defendants’ conduct did not fall 
within the labor exemptions from the antitrust laws.
■ *31 ■
Despite these clear holdings broadly applying antitrust policy 
to health care, relatively little antitrust litigation took place in the 
health care industry until the 1970s. A  30-year period of ignoring 
the antitrust laws and growing anticompetitive practices ensued 
until a gradual and then a galloping increase in the cost for all 
forms of health care began its seemingly inexorable rise.35 Like 
most industries long ignored by antitrust enforcement, anticom­
petitive structures were put in place, anticompetitive practices 
became common, and widespread distortions in the availability 
and price of health care services became extreme. In particular,
„33 Thomas L. Greaney, Competitive Reform in Health Care: The 
Vulnerable Revolution, 5 Y ale  J. R eg. 179,182 (1988).
34 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
35 The yearly trend is summarized in Stephen Martin & John God- 
deeris, Policy and Structural Change in the Health Care Industry, 30 
Antitrust B u ll. 949 (1985).
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the medical profession’s continued insistence upon the fee-for- 
service method for paying for health care and opposition to pre­
paid contract service resulted in “ the creation of a monopoly in 
medical practice through the exclusion of alternative practition­
ers” and the prevention of customer cost and quality controls.36
Increased antitrust attention over the past decade began to 
uncover a number of areas where industry structure and accepted 
practices have contributed significantly to the current crises of a 
misallocation of health care resources, excessive pricing and 
exclusionary practices. While gradually dismantling a large num­
ber of barriers to competition, antitrust litigation over the past two 
decades has also opened up the debate over how to reform the 
health care industry to insure access to all, efficiency in the deliv­
ery of care, and quality in the care delivered. What follows is a 
summary review of recent antitrust litigation dealing with health 
care financing, boycotts, prictf fixing, exclusive dealiijg and tying 
arrangements, and mergers and joint ventures— activities-central 
to health care reform proposals.
1. h e a l t h  c a r e  fin a n c in g  Today, consumers, or more accu­
rately employers offering health care benefits to employees, can 
choose between several different plans for financing health care 
on behalf o f their employees. One method is traditional indemnity 
insurance that reimburses providers on a fee-for-service basis and 
makes no attempt to encourage patients or providers to lower 
costs or control prices. A  second method is to enroll consumers in 
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) whereby consumers 
give up some o f their freedom to choose health care providers by 
agreeing to use services provided by the HMO in exchange for 
full insurance coverage at predetermined prices for the service 
provided.37 Preferred provider organizations (PPOs) offer a middle
36 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of A merican M edicine
21 (1982).
37 For a description of HMOs and PPOs see, Francis H. Miller, Ver­
tical Restraints and Powerful Health Insurers: Exclusionary Conduct 
Masquerading as Managed Care, 51 L aw  & C ontemp. Probs. 195, 200­
01 (1988).
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ground, with consumers allowed to select from a list of competing 
providers who have agreed to limit their charges for most services 
to a predetermined fee schedule. The growth o f HMOs and PPOs 
has been a relatively recent phenomenon because of long-standing 
and effective opposition o f organized medicine to financing . 
mechanisms other than fee-for-service medicine.38
Despite the AM A  case o f 1943, the underlying practice o f the 
medical and hospital establishments o f insisting upon “ free 
choice” for patients in the employment o f their physician and hos­
pital on a fee-for-service basis and without the intervention of a 
contract buyer of the service on behalf o f the patient continued 
until the 1980s. In what has been aptly characterized as the “ Guild 
Free Choice” approach to buying health care services,39 the AM A 
and state and local medical societies prohibited members on “ ethi­
cal” grounds from providing “ contract service” by selling health 
care services prospectively on a prepaid basis to persons belong-
38 The growth of HMOs aiftd PPOs controlled by insurance compa­
nies has begun to raise serious issues for physicians excluded from serv­
ing patients in the HMO or PPO. See Ron Winslow & Edward Felsenthal, 
Physicians Fight Back as Insurers Cut Them From Health Networks, 
W all St . J., Dec. 30, 1993, at 1, col. 1. Some states have been passing 
statutes precluding insurers and employers from excluding physicians 
and hospitals willing to provide service at the same price as the PPO 
from receiving payment from the insurer. See V a . C ode § 38.2-2407 
(1950). The statute has been upheld over claims that it is preempted by 
ERISA. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 
245 Va. 24, 426 S.E.2d 117 (1993); Stuart Circle Hospital v. Aetna 
Health Management, 995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir, 1993).
State laws requiring insurers and employers to deal with all providers 
willing to provide service at the same price as the negotiated price a PPO 
is willing to provide the service wipe out the advantage of the PPO. On 
the other hand, an exclusive arrangement between a PPO and an 
employer or insurer excluding competing providers from providing the 
service has earmarks of a concerted refusal to deal or boycott. See 
Edward Felsenthal, Recent Rulings May Threaten Health Plans, W all 
St. J., Nov. 3,1993, at Bl, col. 1. .
39 Charles D. Weller, “Free Choice” as a Restraint o f Trade in Amer­
ican Health Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 Iowa L. Rev . 1351 (1984).
Health care : 75
ing to the group covered by the contract. In the name of keeping 
control over medical decisions in the hands of the medical profes­
sion in general and the treating physician in particular, the profes­
sion obtained a monopoly over economic decision making in, 
access to, and the method for financing health care.40 Third-party 
insurers under an obligation to pay the bill for all services pro­
vided by the doctor and hospital in accord with the medical 
profession’s definition of acceptable practice, had.no control over 
what services were provided, the quantity o f care ordered, the 
quality of the care offered, and the price of the care chosen.
The consequences of third-party insurer payment on a fee-for- 
service basis for health care services chosen by patients and their 
physicians have been obvious. Consumer choice of providers and 
treatments have not been constrained by price considerations. 
Suppliers of services have not been constrained by a competitive 
process in determining their fees and choices of services where a 
third-party payor is present and obligated to pay for all or most of 
the services chosen by the insured patient and the provider. Under 
what has been a cost-plus regime for financing health care expen­
ditures, total health care costs have escalated dramatically; those
40 Professor Havighurst has observed: “ Centralization of medical- 
economic decisions in the hands of the medical profession imparts to the 
highly diverse and fragmented health care industry an essentially monop­
olistic character and should raise further doubts about its economic effi­
ciency.”
Professor Havighurst astutely notes that the health care system exer­
cises monopoly power not by reducing output but by preventing those 
paying for services from “acting as independent decision makers compet­
ing to provide more cost-effective coverage to consumers. . . .” While 
the welfare loss in the typical monopoly circumstance results from an 
underallocation of resources to the activity, in health care “the welfare 
loss attributable to noncompetitive conditions . . .  Jias taken the form of 
an overallocation, rather than an underallocation, of resources to the 
industry.” Clark C. Havighurst, Decentralizing Decision Making: Private 
Contract Versus Professional Norms, in M arket Reforms i n  H ealth  
Care 22, 26 (J. Meyer ed., 1983).
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who* cannot afford the priceJhave had to forego insurance and, 
often, care; public health care services for the uninsured have both 
been strained to capacity and have deteriorated in the quality of 
care provided; cross-subsidies have multiplied geometrically; and 
the cost of health care benefits has become a serious problem for 
individuals, employers and governments.
On the supply side o f the market, excess capacity has been 
growing in both hospital space and equipment; distortions in 
provider markets have been growing with practitioners gravitating 
to high income specialties and understaffing low income ones; 
insurers and employers have been attempting to monitor more 
closely health care provider decisions by establishing bureau­
cratic, expensive and time-consuming monitoring systems; and, 
individuals, employers, insurers and governments have been 
straining to meet ever-increasing costs of providing health care 
insurance or shedding the responsibility for doing so wherever 
possible.
In a little noticed Ford-Carter era FTC proceeding culminating 
in a 1979 cease and desist order,41 the FTC found that the AM A ’s 
ethical rules— followed by state and local medical societies at that 
time— constituted an agreement to prevent members from solicit­
ing business by advertising, to fix prices and to restrain members 
from engaging in competitive practice formats. The Commission 
found that the ethical rules prohibited advertising and the solicita­
tion of patients;42 that methods of delivering health care services
41 American Medical Ass’n, 94 FTC 980, 1015 (1979), enforced sub 
nom., American Medical Ass’n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), 
aff’d by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). The opinions are 
thoroughly and perceptively reviewed in Weller, supra note 39.
42 The Commission found: “This evidence is susceptible to no inter­
pretation other than that ethical principles of the medical profession have 
prevented doctors and medical organizations from disseminating infor­
mation on the prices and services they offer, severely inhibiting competi­
tion among health care providers. Because prepaid health care plans and 
other alternative providers depend heavily on advertising to announce 
their existence and explain their programs, the advertising restrictions
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through systems other than the traditional fee-for-service method 
(particularly through prepaid plans) had been harshly impacted by 
the advertising and solicitation prohibition; that the purpose and 
effect o f the prohibition was to suppress competition among 
physicians; and that an ethical rule providing that a physician 
“ should not dispose of his services under terms and conditions 
which interfere with or impair the free and complete exercise of 
medical judgement and skill” was enforced for the purpose of pre­
serving the traditional fee-for-service method o f payment for 
medical services and to prevent the development o f prepaid con­
tract mechanisms for the payment for medical services.43
The net effect o f the AM A’s ethical rules, and similar policies 
followed by hospitals,44 was the channeling of health care financ­
ing down the path o f fee-for-service payment only, a cost-plus 
system of health care financing that conferred immunity from the 
development of competitive methods for financing and delivering
have had an even harsher impact on such organizations.” 94 FTC at 
1005-06.
43 The FTC found that the effect of the enforcement of this policy 
was to prevent the development of ( 1) contractual arrangements that 
affect the adequacy of fees by underbidding where they precluded the 
free choice of a physician by a patient; (2) the prevention of financing 
methods that compensated physicians on other than a fee-for-service 
basis; and (3) financing mechanisms that involved physician arrange­
ments with nonphysicians. See 94 FTC at 1011-17.
44 In 1933, the American Hospital Association adopted a policy 
expressly providing that competition among hospitals was to be iavoided 
and that fees for hospital services under group insurance plans should be 
available to all hospitals in an area and be available to any subscriber to 
which his physician has access. The policy expressly provided that con­
trol of any plan must not be transferred to an “enrolling agency” and that 
hospitals should “decline to enter into contracts with any business agency 
which controls or seeks to control the finances or management of the 
plan.” Quoted in Weller, supra note 39, at 1365. The effects of this pol­
icy were to maintain the fee-for-service or cost-plus method for financing 
hospital services, prevent the development of prepaid plans where the 
insurer retained some control over cost and utilization, and make staff 
privileges with peer review at a hospital a crucial entry factor to hospital 
utilization and competition between both providers and hospitals.
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health care services. Fee-for-service compensation financed by 
third-party insurance became the root cause of inflation in health 
care costs and the misallocation o f health care resources that we 
are now struggling to*change.45 Following the FTC ’s antitrust 
action enjoining the AM A ’s ethical rules, consumers and employ­
ers paying the insurance bill began to have a choice between the 
traditional fee-for-service insurance plans46 and a variety of pre­
paid or contract plans, primarily different forms of HMOs47 and
45 At the beginning of the 1980s, approximately 10 million con­
sumers belonged to HMOs. By 1992, membership in HMOs had grown to 
over 40 million. Greg Seinmetz, New Treatment, W all St . J., May 18, 
1993, at 1. It is estimated at the end of 1993 that over 90 million belong 
to either HMOs or PPOs. See Winslow & Felsenthal, supra note 38. The 
dramatic growth in group buying of health care services during the 1980s 
and 1990s followed the FTC’s action enjoining the A M A ’s ethical rules 
mandating fee-for-service delivery of health care. For an excellent review 
of the significance of the FTC’s action against the AMA, see .Weller, 
supra note 39. Professor Weller aptly describes the consequences of the 
fee-for-service model as: making each hospital and practitioner a “ self­
contained market” insulated from economic competition like in a hori­
zontal market division, id. at 1373; making each provider a “ financial 
island unaccountable to anyone but himself at a time when scientific 
medicine was weaving a pattern of clinical interdependence,” id. at 1374; 
“ isolating each provider from financial responsibility for the overall cost 
of health carfe services” while eliminating “private incentives for effi­
ciency” ; and, making providers ignorant of the financial impact of their 
decisions and the public damage done thereby, id. at 1374.
46 The traditional cost-plus financing of health care was also main­
tained by the medical profession since the 1930s through devices like set­
ting up doctor or hospital controlled insurance programs like Blue 
Cross-Blue Shield. See Weller, supra note 39, at 1367.
^  41 A  general description of how HMOs function is as follows: 
“Health maintenance organizations . . . are the prototype prepaid plans, 
and in traditional closed-panel HMOs, insurance and provider functions 
are technically merged. Salaried physicians and allied health personnel
- provide basic medical services freed from temptation to receive extra 
income from superfluous care. Hospitalization takes place either in 
HMO-owned facilities or in hospitals contracting to comply with the 
HMOs cost-containment directives. In open-panel HMOs, on the other 
hand, the independent contractor physicians who provide medical serv-
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PPOs48 permitting choice on the basis of price, quality and bene­
fits before service is provided. Competition among prepaid plans 
requires that they closely monitor tosts because “ they risk finan­
cial catastrophe if they underwrite comprehensive but unmoni­
tored medical expenses for a single fixed premium.” 49 In the 
1980s, a fundamental policy o f antitrust finally began to be 
applied to health care financing: that the ojiJton of intelligent con­
sumer choice before a service is providers essential if competi­
tion is to determine price, quality, allocation of resources and 
innovation in health care markets.
2. PEER REVIEW, CREDENTIALING AND OTHER HEALTH GARE PROVIDER
e x c l u s io n a r y  p r a c t ic e s  A  large number of health care antitrust
ices are unsalaried. Doctors are usually compensated either on a capita­
tion basis for each HMO patient in their care, or on a discounted fee-for- 
service basis, with incentives to discourage excess utilization built into 
the reimbursement formula.” Miller, supra note 37, at 200.
■ ' * ^48 PPOs may be described as follows: “Preferred provider organiza­
tions . . . are an important variation on the prepaid health insurance 
theme, and combine features of both HMO and fee-for-service insurance 
coverage. If the PPO insured receives care from a ‘preferred’ provider, 
who has contracted with the PPO to render services subject to managed 
care constraints, the insurance premium covers the full costs of care. If 
instead the insured chooses to obtain care from a non-con tractive 
provider, PPO coverage functions as indemnity insurance. This means 
that insured patients have to pay their non-PPO provider bills directly. 
They will usually be reimbursed for only a part of that expense, however, 
because non-preferred provider charges ordinarily exceed those allowed 
by the P Y O ” Id. at 200-01.
A  PPO gives subscribers a financial incentive to get medical care 
from preferred providers approved by the plan because they render serv­
ice at a discount. See Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., 
Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986) (describing various PPO plans in a 
case by Indiana hospitals challenging Blue Cross decision to offer a PPO . 
plan in the face of declining market share for Blue Cross’ traditional 
reimbursement on a fee-for-service basis). The court’s opinion, by Judge 
Easterbrook, finding no violation, is extensively criticized in Miller, 
supra note 47, at 226-30.
49 Miller, supra note 47, at 200.
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cases in the past decade have involved peer review—joint action 
usually by members o f a specialty or by a hospital staff passing 
upon the qualifications and fitness of a practitioner to remain in 
the specialty or hospital, or to join it. Credentialing concerns a 
large array of private and public mechanisms for both carving out 
and certifying institutions and personnel as qualified for providing 
health care services and specialties.50 Both forms of entry control 
can be o f great significance to the level o f competition among 
providers o f a service and between providers of competing serv­
ices,51 as well as to the success or failure o f an individual provider
50 See Daniel v. American Bd. of Emergency Medicine, 802 F. Supp. 
912 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding jurisdiction over complaint that Board 
illegally denied plaintiff right to sit for exams leading to certification as a 
“specialist” in emergency medicine). .
Professional specialties may also be involved in issuing public state­
ments concerning the safety, validity, or effectiveness of a particular serv­
ice or medical procedure. In Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthal­
mology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1989), the Academy had labeled the 
procedure of radial keratotomy, corneal surgery designed to remedy near­
sightedness, as “experimental,” thereby precluding insurance reimburse­
ment for the treatment. Plaintiffs brought an unsuccessful antitrust suit 
claiming the press release was the product of a conspiracy by Academy 
members to restrain trade. The case was tried to a jury for
1 month and the jury found for the defendants; a decision affirmed on 
appeal by the Seventh Circuit. Judge Easterbrook, author of the opinion, 
could see no justification for the suit, although labeling the procedure 
“experimental,”  rather than “ investigational” made surgery not reim­
bursable under Medicare and limited the number of surgeries done. For 
an earlier antitrust action against a federal advisory council on eye care, 
finding immunity for limiting those who could provide the surgery, see 
Vest v. Waring, 565 F. Supp. 674 (D.N.D. Ga. 1983).
51 Compare Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert, 
denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985) with Ballard v. Blue Shield of S.W. Va., 
Inc., 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977).
A  boycott organized by almost all the major health care credentialing • 
and trade associations of chiropractic services on the ground that it was a 
“cult” and not scientifically legitimate is described and analyzed in Wilk 
v. American Medical Ass’n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 
467 U.S. 1210 (1984); see also Ballard v. Blue Shield o f S.W. Va., supra 
(finding a combination of medical associations and insurers to deny reim­
bursement for chiropractic services unlawful).
Healthcare : 81
“whose business is so small that his destruction makes little dif­
ference to the economy.”52 Such conduct, as well as horizontal 
agreements among providers refusing to provide cost information 
to insurers53 and refusals by insurers to reimburse particular 
providers,54 have earmarks of a boycott,55 a joint refusal to deal
52 Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway Hale'Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
For an application of the Sherman Act to cases involving a minimal con­
nection to interstate commerce in the health care field, see Summit 
Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991) (stressing judicial focus on 
the potential harm of a conspiracy to interstate commerce); Sweeney v. 
Athens Regional Medical Center, 709 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1989) 
(finding a hospital and staff boycott of nurse midwife offering at-home 
birthing services in which jurisdiction was upheld). For a perceptive 
review of antitrust jurisdictional questions in light o f Summit, see 
Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation o f 
Antitrust Federalism, 61 G eo. W ash. L. Rev. 657 (1993).
53 FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (agreement 
by dentists refusing to supply x-rays to insurers seeking to control costs 
is an unlawful restraint similar to a boycott under the rule of reason); see 
also Commonwealth v. Cahill, 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) U 70,109 
(D. Mass) (finding a conspiracy by physicians to refuse to deal with Blue 
Cross).
54 See National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue 
Cross, 452 U.S. 378 (1981) (reversing dismissal of Sherman Act §§ 1 &
2 claims by a new hospital against Blue Cross for refusing to enter into a 
reimbursement agreement with the new hospital). Blue Cross sought to 
justify its refusal on the ground that construction of plaintiff’ s new hospi­
tal addition had not been approved by the local Hospital Systems Agency 
established pursuant to the National Health Planning and Resources 
Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 3001, et seq. The Court found that 
the Act did not contain an implied repeal of the antitrust laws and stated: 
“ The record discloses no formal request from the Missouri MAHSA to 
Blue Cross to refrain from accepting petitioner as a new participating 
hospital. Even if such a request had been made, it could not have been 
more than the advice of a private planning body— albeit a planning body 
created and funded by the Federal Government. This fact is crucial 
because antitrust repeals are especially disfavored where the antitrust 
implications of a business decision have not been considered by a gov­
ernmental entity.” 452 U.S, at 390. , • ■.
55 See Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891^ 
(1993) (discussion of the meaning of the concept “ boycott” and related j
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for purposes o f fixing prices or the adoption of regulatory power 
by a private group to determine who may enter a market.56
Supreme Court concern with the political value of preserving 
the right o f an individual to enter or remain in a market without 
regard for how much commerce is affected, or whether the dis­
placement o f a competitive process causes a measurable impact 
on price or resource allocation, is well demonstrated by the case 
o f Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas\57 The elimination of a single 
ophthalmological surgeon from th  ^ Los Angeles market for such 
services by revocation of hospital privileges because o f a refusal 
to require the presence o f a second surgeon during“surgery was 
found to meet the interstate commerce requirements of the Sher­
man Act. The Court held that the essence o f a Sherman Act con­
spiracy violation was the agreement itself, not the amount o f 
commerce affected.58 Consequently, the potential harm of the con­
concepts for purposes of defining the exception to the McCarran-Fergu- 
son Act exemption from antitrust for the “business of insurance”),
56 For a comprehensive review of peer review in the hospital context 
see James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Antitrust and Hospital Peer 
Review, 51; L aw  &  C ontemp P robs. 7 (1988).
57 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991). See Roxane C. Busey & Peter B. Free­
man, The View From the Summit: Jurisdiction and Beyond, 60 A ntitrust
L.J. 725 (1992); Gavil, supra note 52.
\
58 The Court’s assertion that the essence of a § 1 violation is the con­
tract or conspiracy to displace the competitive process determining price 
and related matters like entry is not new doctrine. See United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 n.59 (1940): “ [J]t is 
. . . well settled that conspiracies under the Sherman Act are not depen­
dent on any overt act other than the act of conspiring. . . . It is the ‘con­
tract, combination . . .  or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce’ 
which § 1 of the Act strikes down, whether the concerted activity be 
wholly nascent or abortive on the one hand, or successful on the other. 
. . . And the amount of interstate or foreign trade is not material . . . 
since § 1 of the Act brands as illegal the character of the restraint not the 
amount of commerce affected.” ,
The conduct o f the defendants combining to deny the plaintiff the 
opportunity to succeed or fail pursuant to a competitive process deter­
mines both the jurisdictional base for the application of the Sherman Act
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spiracy if successful was the measure o f whether commerce 
clause jurisdiction had,been established over the conspiracy.59 The 
Court found that if the conspiracy were successful, there would be 
a reduction in ophthalmological services in the Los Angeles mar­
ket and a restraint on that market genbr^tty would be threatened 
vis-a-vis other surgeons subject to the same threat in the market 
for providing ophthalmological services.
Nor did the state action doctrine stave o ff antitrust review 
of the termination o f hospital privileges o f a single surgeon in 
Astoria, Oregon in Patrick v, Burget.60 Patrick was originally 
employed by a clinic in Astoria located in the only hospital in the 
area, a hospital that had also granted Patrick st^ff privileges. After 
Patrick established an independent practice in competition with 
the surgical practice of the clinic, physicians associated with the 
clinic refused to deal with him. Several years later proceedings 
were begun to terminate Patrick’s hospital privileges on the 
ground that his care of patients was below the standards of the 
hospital. Patrick maintained that the proceeding to revoke his hos­
pital privileges was for the purpose of reducing competition from 
his surgery practice rather than to improve patient care, a proposi­
to their conduct and the issue of whether their conduct violates the 
statute.
59 Citing McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 
232 (1980) (finding that under the Sherman Act, proof o f either an 
unlawful purpose or effect is sufficient to establish jurisdiction). The case 
is interestingly reviewed in Andrew I. Gavil, supra, note 52, suggesting 
that the original intent of the framers of the Sherman Act was to focus on 
“ the nature of the predator, not the prey . . . to define the needed federal 
antidote in terms of jurisdiction.” 61 G eo. W ash. L. Rev . at 714.
60 486 U.S. 94 (1988); see also Shahawy v, Harrison, 875 F.2d 1529 
(11th Cir.'1989) (finding active state supervision of peer review process 
inadequate to create a state action defense); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 930 
F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding no active state supervision, means no 
antitrust immunity); Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope Hosp. 
Dist., 940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1168 (1992) 
(holding that local hospital districts are not specifically authorized to act 
anticompetitively by state law). i •
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tion.the jury agreed with in awarding Patrick antitrust damages 
for the termination of his hospital privileges. The Ninth Circuit 
agreed that the evidence supported a finding that the peer review 
process was invoked in bad faith, but held the defendants immune 
from antitrust liability because o f the state action doctrine. In 
reversing, the Supreme Court held that the state action defense 
was not available because there was no active supervision of the 
peer review process by the state, a requirement for state action 
immunity reenforced in the Court’s most recent state action deci­
sion, FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.61
In rejecting the state action defense by requiring that there be 
active and objective state supervision of the state-exempted con  ^
duct, the Court took note of the benefits of peer review as a proc­
ess for the “provision of quality medical care” and the enactment 
of the Health Care Quality Improvements Act of 1986,62 providing 
a level o f antitrust treble damage immunity for peer review 
actions executed in conformity with the Act.63 The Act’s grant of 
antitrust immunity is carefully circumscribed however, and does 
not provide immunity from antitrust injunctive actions, govern­
ment antitrust actions, and possibly treble damage liability for 
peer review actions not taken “ iii the furtherance of quality health 
care” and ones not conforming to the lengthy list of procedural 
requirements set forth in the Act.64 Consequently, peer review 
activity remains subject to potential antitrust liability, in govern­
ment actions, private injunction cases and in circumstances like
■«.' 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992). .
62 42 U.S.C. § 11101, et seq. The action in Patrick was filed prior to 
enactment of the statute. For a review of the statute see Joan M. Roe- 
diger, Antitrust Implications o f Peer Review Organizations, 39 M ed . 
Trial Tech. Q. 389 (1993).
63 For an application of the statute holding a peer review proceeding 
immune, see Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1992).
64 See Decker v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 982 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1992); 
Manion v. Evans, 986 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1993). The Act is reviewed in 
Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 56; Roediger, supra note 62.
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those of the Patrick case, when it is done “not in the reasonable 
belief in the furtherance o f quality health care,” nor in conformiiy 
with the extensive due process requirements set forth by the Act.65
Another form of joint action having the earmarks o f an 
antitrust boycott are arrangements between HMOs and similar
provider collectives and insurers excluding providers not admitted
- • ■ . ^  . . ■
to membership in the provider organization from reimbursement 
for treating plan beneficiaries. As medical practitioners, hospitals 
and clinics become collectivized to a greater or lesser degree to 
bargain collectively66 through HMOs, PPOs, and other joint sell­
ers o f services with large collectives of potential patients managed 
by private or public insurers, complex antitrust issues raising 
exclusive dealing, boycott, concerted refusals to deal and tying 
arrangement issues can and have arisen.67 One issue is the degree 
to which individual practitioners, hospitals or clinics must be 
organized into some form of recognized legal entity in order to 
avoid a finding that joint action by the individuals constitutes a
«  42 U.S.C.§ 11112(a)(1).
66 In some instances, unincorporated groups of providers have 
sought, unsuccessfully, to analogize their activities to a labor union. See 
Colorado v. Colorado Union of Physicians & Surgeons, 1990-1 Trade 
Cases 11 68,968 (D. Colo. 1990).
67 For example, in Capital Imaging Ass’n v. Mohawk Valley Medi­
cal Ass’n, 725 F. Supp. 669 (N.D.N.Y. 1989), one of the two diagnostic 
imaging services group practices in the Albany, New York area claimed 
that its competitor’s exclusive arrangement for magnetic resonance imag­
ing (MRI) services with an HMO constituted an antitrust violation. The 
defendants were an independent practice association (IPA) of practicing 
physicians and an insurer contracting with IPAs for physicians’ services 
to provide service to the insurer’s customers. Physician members of the 
plaintiff radiological firm were denied membership in the IPA and were 
therefore excluded from providing services for the members of the HMO. 
The court held the arrangement between the HMO and the IPA was not a 
“boycott” but would be analyzed unde^ r the rule of reason as a vertical 
exclusive dealing arrangement. The Case was subsequently dismissed for 
failure to prove a conspiracy and an unreasonable restraint of trade. 791
F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). , _
(footnote 67 continued)
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contract, combination or conspiracy for antitrust purposes.68 
-While current litigation is splitting in several different directions 
on this issue, it is an issue that confronts reform proposals with 
difficult choices ifw e  are to avoid creating a loophole from effec­
tive regulation by the competitive process and antitrust policy or
See also Beard v. Parkview Hospital, 912 F.2d 138 (6th Cir., 1990); 
A ll Care Nursing Service, Inc. v. Bethesda Memorial Hospital, Inc., 887 
F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1989); Coffey v. Healthhurst, Inc., 955 F.2d 1388. 
(10th Cir. 1992); Fuentes v. South Hills Cardiology, 946 F.2d 196 (3d" 
Cir. 1991); In Re Workers’ Compensation Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 
867 F.2d 1552 (8th Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 492 U.S. 920; Chiropractic 
Co-op Ass’n v. American Medical Ass’n, 867 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1989); 
Action Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Atlanticare Health Services, Inc., 8l5 
F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1993); Swathmore Radiation Oncology, Inc. v. 
Lapes, 812 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
Physicians excluded from HMOs and PPOs have begun to file law­
suits challenging their exclusion on a number of grounds other than 
antitrust, including interference with the physician-patient relationship. 
See Winslow & Felsenthal, supra note 38.
68 Compare, Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hospital, 945 F.2d 696 (4th 
Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992) (declaring that physicians 
holding staff privileges at hospital and hospital incapable of conspiring), 
with Bolt v. Halifax Hospital Medical Center, 891 F.2d 810 (11th Cir.
1990), cert denied, 495 U.S. 924, and Boczar v. Manatee Hospitals & 
Health Systems, Inc., 993 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that hospi­
tal medical staff independent entrepreneurs may conspire with each other 
for Sherman Act purposes and staff members may be found to have con­
spired with hospital). The split in the circuits on this issue is analyzed in 
Murray S. Monroe, Health Care: Current Antitrust Issues, 20 N. Ky. L. 
Rev . 365,367-68 (1993).
Group actions by hospitals to bargain collectively through their trade 
association for temporary nursing services with several competing nurs­
ing agencies was attacked in A ll Care Nursing Service, Inc. v. Bethesda 
Memorial Hospital, 887 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that tempo­
rary injunction granted plaintiff nursing agencies reversed for failure of 
trial court to hold a hearing). For a comprehensive review of the concepts 
of contract, combination and conspiracy see William E. Kovacic, The 
Identification and Proof o f Horizontal Agreements Under the Antitrust 
Laws, 38 A ntitrust B u l l . 5 (1993).
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by the imposition of affirmative government regulation to prevent 
abuse where antitrust policy is held not to apply and joint action 
generates anticompetitive effects.
Whatever form is chosen to organize providers into bargaining 
units to deal with insurers, those excluded from the bargaining 
group will no doubt consider antitrust policy as a remedy for their 
exclusion. I f  the organization is not labeled a boycott or other sec­
tion 1 per se violation,69 a central question in such conduct will no 
doubt be the degree to which the organized group possesses 
“power” in the affected markets, an elusive and multipurpose con­
cept in antitrust analysis. The Supreme Court’s decision in East­
man Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,™ requires a 
fact-based determination as opposed to a theoretical one, in deter­
mining whether a firm has market “power.” Even though Kodak 
was found to have a relatively small share of the market for pho­
tocopying and micrographic equipment, that finding did not pre­
clude the possibility that Kodak possessed power in the markets 
for parts and repair service for Kodak’s equipment because of 
information and switching costs incurred by buyers of the equip­
ment. A  realistic-approach to the question of “power” in antitrust 
analysis treats the concept as a functional tool for connecting the 
facts o f the dispute to the policies behind the law, not as an objec-
69 The degree of formality required for a group to escape being 
found to be a combination of competitors rather than a single legal entity, 
is crucial in determining whether to analyze the arrangement as a § 1'. 
boycott or a § 2 case of unlawful monopolization or attempt to monopo­
lize. Forming an “ association” is not enough to, escape being found to be 
a § 1 contract combination or conspiracy. See F.T.C. v. Superior Court 
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990); F.T.C. v. Indiana Federation 
of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical 
Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). I f the parties are found to be a combination 
of competitors, power is not relevant in determining whether their joint 
conduct amounts to a per se violation or an unreasonable restraint of 
trade.
70 112 S. Ct. 2072(1992).
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tive thing in physical reality to be identified by an abstract model 
or physical measurements o f size or weight.71
71 Legal positivists and many economists assume the reasoning 
involved in'analyzing a legal dispute is deductive logic where Rules 
x Facts = Right Decision. Reaffirming unexamined assumptions underly­
ing fixed premises by a simplistic form of deductive logic may be useful 
for impressing naive students by manipulating models to produce “ truth” 
or for generating seemingly “scientific” papers producing “ truth,” but has 
little value in the real world for resolving disputes in light of the norma­
tive policies underlying the law in the context of the facts and circum­
stances of the dispute. Extreme legal realists view the process of legal 
reasoning as one of rationalizing a decision one comes to for political or 
qther reasons independent of definable rules and principles capable of 
objective verification or systematic application. Legal reasoning must 
grapple with the reality of disputes on a far more complex basis than that 
assumed by positivists and on a more constrained level than admitted by 
the extreme realists. Law and legal reasoning implementing “ the law” is a 
complex inductive process where determinations of the (1) relevance, (2) 
meaning, and (3) application of rules and facts are dependent upon the 
policies behind the law and the consequences of the decision made, as 
well as the words of the rules and the circumstances of the dispute. The 
process, one of inductive, not deductive reasoning constantly confronts 
the assumptions of fact and policy underlying premises at each of the 
three analytical steps of deciding relevance, meaning and application of 
both the rules and the facts, and may be diagramed as follows for those 
who find two-dimensional diagrams of the multidimensional complexi­




It is a reasoning process surrounded by several institutional con­
straints as well. One restraint is the role definition of judges mandating
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The implications of Kodak for antitrust analysis of the power 
of legally recognized entities created for bargaining purposes in 
health care may indeed be significant.72 Providers excluded from 
such entities and unable to claim a section 1 violation, may still 
be able to claim a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act where 
the entity possesses “ power” and consumers locked into a 
provider group are precluded from dealing with competing 
providers. It is a significant issue generating health care litigation 
on antitrust and other grounds, and an issue legislative reform of 
health care must address.
3. pr ic e  f ix in g  A  closely related issue concerns the degree to 
which providers organized into groups and insurers and other enti­
ties bargaining on behalf of consumers with provider organiza­
tions may set prices they will offer on behalf o f the group of 
providers or insureds in the bargaining between them. As health 
insurers have become more price conscious and better at negotiat­
ing discounts and capitation fees, providers increasingly claim
that they follow legislative intent and be limited generally by evidence 
presented in open court and by the arguments of the parties in their deter­
mination of facts and law. Also, constitutional limitations, like the right 
to jury trial, as well as procedural and other limitations upon the process 
of factfinding and the use of precedent and other sources of law signifi­
cantly confine judicial discretion. Finally, there are inherent limitations 
upon language and the concepts it generates to carry, the “ freight” of 
meaning many simplistically assume language can carry with little or no 
attention paid to distinctions like those between connotation and denota­
tion and the complex process by which the mind comes to understand the 
meaning of words in the context of their use and in the application of 
words and the concepts they generate to specific facts in the particular 
circumstances of a dispute. See John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy and the 
Concept o f a Competitive Process, 35 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev . 893 (1990). 
The legal analysis of disputes is intensively empirical and the more one is 
immersed in facts, the less relevant abstrapt models become. See Mark 
Cooney, Why Is Economic Analysis So Appealing to Law Professors?, 45 
Stan . L. Rev. 2211 (1993).
72 See Michael S. Jacobs, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law and 
Their Implications fo r the Clinton Health Care Plan, 21 J.L. Med, & 
Ethics 163 (1993).
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that they lack the bargaining power individually to negotiate fair 
fees and therefore need to band together to negotiate collectively 
with large insurers. Often, health care providers that otherwise 
operate independently have discussed and agreed upon fees for 
certain services offered to powerful buyers. These fee schedules 
bear many of the earmarks o f prohibited price fixing, much like 
the practices o f organized labor bargaining collectively with 
employers. Ultimately, legislative exemptions from the antitrust 
laws were required for collective bargaining by officially recog­
nized unions before the courts finally yielded in their hostility to 
collective bargaining as a prohibited form of horizontal price fix­
ing.73 In the absence of having the legally recognized status o f a 
labor union or the single entity status of a corporation or other 
legally recognized single business entity, there is no antitrust 
immunity for joint or collaborative activity by otherwise competi­
tive economic actors.74
73 Section 6 of the Clayton Act declares that the “ labor of a human 
being is not a commodity or article of commerce” and that the existence 
of labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations formed for mutual self 
help, “not having capital stock or conducted for profit” shall not “be held 
or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of 
trade under the antitrust laws.” 15 U.S.C. § 17. Section 20 of the Clayton 
Act, 29 U.S.C. §52, precludes, the issuance of injunctions in any case 
involving disputes over terms and conditions of employment unless nec­
essary to prevent irreparable injury. Due to judicial hostility against 
unions engaging in coercive strikes, Congress adopted the Norris- 
LaGuardia Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C. § 104, further confining the exercise 
of judicial power to order injunctions in labor disputes and establishing 
the National Labor Relations Board to regulate labor-management rela­
tions. The history and status of the relationship between antitrust policy 
and labor legislation is reviewed in Louis B. Schwartz, et al., supra note 
14, at 1070, et seq. -
74 See F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411
(1990) (denying antitrust immunity to an association of lawyers “strik­
ing” the District of Columbia government for higher fees for representing 
indigent criminal defendants in the District of Columbia Superior Court).
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Horizontal price fixing by the agreement o f legally indepen­
dent persons or entities, maximum or minimum, is the classic per 
se violation o f the Sherman Act.75 In Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Medical Society,16 this basic rule o f antitrust was extended to joint 
efforts by medical practitioners establishing “ medical founda­
tions” to set the maximum price that members o f the foundations 
would charge insurance carriers for, specified medical procedures. 
The purpose of establishing “ foundations” was to promote fee- 
for-service medicine and to block the development o f HMOs and 
PPOs as alternatives to fee-for-service financing.77 The Court 
rejected defenses that the arrangement fixed maximum rather than 
minimum prices,78 that the “ industry was one with which the judi-
75 Although it is beyond the scope of this article to explore the 
nature of per se rules, the legal status of the rules of per se illegality is 
ambiguous. While cases like F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 493 
U.S. 411 (1990) and Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 
(1982) suggest that the per se rules of antitrust are substantive rules of 
law, cases like Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) and 
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 
(1984) proceed on a basis that assumes that per se rules are rules of evi­
dentiary presumptions of varying levels of rebutability. See John J. 
Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Section 1 Analysis: Three Proposals for 
Reducing the Chaos, 49 Antitrust L.J. 1593 (1980); John J. Flynn, The 
Function and Dysfunction o f Per Se Rules in Vertical Market Restraints,
58 W ash. U. L.Q. 727 (1980); John J. Flynn, The “Is ” and “Ought*  o f  
Vertical Market Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service 
Corp., 71 Cornell L. Rev. 1095 (1986).
76 457 U.S. 332 (1982). For a recent case dealing with an agreement 
by hospitals to limit advertising and disclosure of quality comparisons 
between the hospitals, see United States v. Hospital Ass’n of Greater Des 
Moines, 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1170,160 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
77 PPOs do not assume responsibility for all the costs the insured 
may incur, as do HMOs. For a comparison of PPOs and HMOs, see Spies 
et al., Alternative Health Care Delivery Systems: HMOs and PPOs, in 
Health C are Cost M anagement: Private, Sector Initiatives (P. Fox et 
al. eds., 1984); A B A  A ntitrust  C om m ittee , M a n a g e d  C are  and  
A ntitrust: T he PPO Experience (1990).
78 The Court rejected this argument on the grounds that the per se
rule is “ grounded on faith in price competition as a market force,” that
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ciary had little experience,79 that the arrangement was by mem­
bers of a learned profession80 and that there were procompetitive 
justifications.81 The assumption o f the power to set prices for
the price restraint imposed provides the same economic reward to all 
regardless of their individual abilities, the restraint may deter entry and 
experimentation with new methods of delivering the service and it may 
be a masquerade for fixing uniform prices. 457 U.S. at 348.
79 The Court rejected this argument by citing Socony-Vacuum for the 
proposition that so far as price fixing is concerned, the Sherman Act 
“ establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike and that 
the elimination of so-called competitive evils . . .  is no justification” for 
price-fixing agreements. 457 U.S. at 349. This holding overruled the 
implication of United States v. Oregon Medical Soc’y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 
(1952), that the medical profession was immune from the normal rales of 
antitrust policy. Since the decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 
U.S. 773 (1975), it has become increasingly clear that the Court is 
becoming less and less sympathetic to claims of some level of immunity 
for the professions based on traditional ethical norms of a profession lim­
iting competition. See Clark C. Havighurst, The Contributions o f 
Antitrust Law to a Procompetitive Health Policy, in Market Reforms in 
Health Care 295 (J. Meyer ed., 1983).
80 The Court cited Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 
(1975), and National Soc’y of Professional Eng’rs v. United States, 435 
U.S. 679 (1978) for the proposition that price fixing in a profession unre­
lated to enhancing professional norms or which facilitate customer pay­
ments is no defense. 457 U.S. at 349.
81 The Court rejected this defense on the grounds that the per se 
rules foreclose justifications being offered because the rule is premised 
on the anticompetitive potential of all price-fixing agreements, that a 
guarantee of complete coverage required agreement on the price to be 
charged and the price was being fixed by agreement of doctors participat­
ing in the plan, and that it was up to Congress to change the law not the 
courts. The Court distinguished Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal 
Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), on the grounds that in that case the 
insurer fixed the price, not the providers, in order to guarantee full reim­
bursement for prescriptions. Tile claim that the practice involved only 
“price fixing in a literal sense,” relying on Broadcast Music, Inc., v. 
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), was rejected on the 
ground that the doctors’ combination in the form of “ foundations” was a 
combination of competitors selling medical care in competition with one 
another and not a combination creating a new product. The combination
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medical services by competitors providing that service, as opposed 
to an arrangement between insurers and insureds setting the price 
at which they would be reimbursed for medical services,82 was 
found to be the essential factor causing the conduct in question to 
fall into the per se category of “price fixing.”83
in Broadcast Music was characterized as one creating a new product, the 
blanket license, for which a price had to be set.
82 See Hassan v. Independent Practice Ass’n, P.C., 698 F. Supp. 679 
(E.D. Mich. 1988) (distinguishing Maricopa on the grounds that the 
defendant HMO incorporated and assumed the role of an insurer rather 
than formed a confederation of competitors in the form of a “foundation” 
to administer the price and payments made by independent insurers). 
Such an arrangement did not save the policy of a physician-administered 
insurance plan involving 90%-93% of eligible physicians in Oregon 
refusing to allow podiatrists and other nonphysicians to join the plan. 
Hahn v. Oregon Physicians’ Serv., 868 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1988), cert, 
denied* 493 U.S. 846 (1989). Members were reimbursed up to 90% of 
their charges, while nonmembers >vere reimbursed up to 60% of their 
charges. Since physicians controlled the insurer and operated it on a PPO 
basis, the court held there was sufficient evidence for a jury to determine 
whether the arrangement constituted a horizontal agreement by competi­
tors to fix prices and boycott podiatrists. See also Virginia Academy of 
Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 
1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
83 The status of vertical price-fixing agreements in health care is 
unsettled. In Group Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 
(1979), the Court was presented with a cost-control program adopted by 
Blue Cross, in which it agreed to reimburse pharmacies filling prescrip­
tions for Blue Cross members on a predetermined fee of cost plus $2 for . 
each prescription filled. The insurer reimbursed insured’s dealing with 
nonparticipating pharmacies at 75% of the price charged. Pharmacists not 
agreeing to the plan sued, claiming the plan constituted price fixing and a 
boycott. The lower courts dismissed the claim on the grounds that the 
conduct was exempt conduct under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, a hold­
ing the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that dealings between an 
insurance company and third parties supplying services to insureds was 
not “ the business of insurance” and was therefore not exempt. The major­
ity did not reach the merits of the price-fixing claim.
On remand, the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the claims of price 
fixing and boycott, rejecting arguments that the individually negotiated 
contracts with each pharmacy constituted either horizontal price fixing
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The thin line between what constitutes per se illegal price fix­
ing and legitimate bargaining between health care providers and 
insurers, is illustrated by United States v. Alston,84 a criminal 
price-fixing case charging three dentists with fixing prices for 
insurance reimbursement and co-payment schedules. The defen­
dants met with fifty other dentists to discuss insurance reimburse­
ment schedules and co-payment schedules and wrote individual 
but identical letters to insurance carriers demanding an upward 
revision in both schedules. A  jury found the defendants had 
agreed to fix the price of co-payment fees and had mailed identi­
cal letters to insurers as part o f a conspiracy. In reversing the trial 
court’s judgment of acquittal overruling the jury verdict, the Ninth 
Circuit found sufficient evidence of a conspiracy or agreement,
between the pharmacies, or vertical price fixing between the insurance 
company and individual pharmacies. No evidence of agreement among 
competing pharmacies to fix prices was found, and coerced conformity 
by a powerful buyer was found insufficient to infer conspiracy on a con­
scious parallelism theory. Also, a claim of vertical price fixing was 
rejected on the ground that the relationship between Blue Cross and the 
pharmacies was the product of independent bargaining, rather than con­
spiracy to fix prices, and that there was no agreement to maintain resale 
prices. Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1433 
(5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985). See also Zinser v. 
Rose, 868 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that parallel conduct by 
insurance companies fixing chiropractor reimbursement not sufficient to 
prove horizontal or vertical agreement); Austin v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of Alabama, 903 F.2d 1385 (11th Cir. 1990) (consumers lacked 
“standing” to challenge agreements between Blue Cross and hospitals 
giving Blue Cross lower rate than that charged plaintiff).
84 974 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992). There are usually two closely con­
nected issues: (1) Is the conduct pursuant to a contract, combination or 
conspiracy; and (2) Is the joint action conduct “price fixing” within the 
legal meaning of that concept. The Alston case raises the issue of what 
kind and how much evidence is required to prove joint action amounts to 
a contract, combination or conspiracy. The second issue is raised by 
cases like Anesthesia Advantage, Inc. v. Metz Group, 759 F. Supp. 638 
(D. Colo. 1991) (standards for sufficiency of the evidence on motion for 
summary judgment to prove price fixing); American Soc’y of Internal 
Medicine, 105 FTC 505 (1985) (advisory opinion rejecting use o f1 “rela­
tive value scales” on the ground that they lead to “price fixing”).
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that it was one to fix prices, and that it resulted in the fixing of 
prices. The court found that FTC  v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Ass’n,*5 holding a “ strike” by defense lawyers representing indi­
gents in the District of Columbia, forcing the local government to 
raise fees, per se illegal price fixing, and established the per se 
rule as “ a substantive rule of antitrust law, not merely a rule of 
administrative convenience.”86
The case points up what could be troubling issues for any 
reform of health care financing based on collective bargaining 
between health care providers and insurers. While individual 
insurers may use the collective power o f their policyholders to 
establish or bargain for lower prices, to what extent may providers 
join together to bargain with insurers? The Alston court noted:
But health care providers who must deal with consumers indirectly 
through plans such as the one in this case face an unusual situation 
that may legitimate certain collective actions. Medical plans serve, 
effectively, as the bargaining agents for large groups of consumers; 
they use the clout of their consumer base to drive down health care 
service fees. Uniform fee schedules— anathema in a normal competi­
tive market— are standard operating procedure when medical plans are 
involved. In light of these departures from a normal competitive mar­
ket, individual health care providers are entitled to take some joint 
action (short of price fixing or a group boycott) to level the bargaining 
imbalance created by the plans and provide meaningful input into the 
setting o f the fee schedules. Thus health care providers might pool 
cost data in justifying a request for an increased fee schedule. . . , 
Providers might also band together to negotiate various other aspects 
of their relationship with the plans such as payment procedures, the 
type of documentation they must provide, the method of referring 
patients and the mechanisms for adjusting disputes. Such concerted 
actions, which would not implicate the per se rule, must be carefully 
distinguished from efforts to dictate terms by explicit or implicit 
threats of mass withdrawals from the plans.87 ,
85 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
86 974 F.2d at 1208.
87 974F.2d at 1214.
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Left unanswered was the degree to which providers must be 
organized into a legally recognizable entity to escape the label of 
independent parties engaging in a contract, combination, or con­
spiracy to fix prices and the degree to which independent parties 
may bargain over elements affecting pricing collectively, without 
crossing the line into conduct that will be identified legally as 
“ price fixing.” These are issues that any reform o f health care 
relying upon “ managed competition” or other forms of collective 
bargaining between providers and insurers must confront and 
resolve if difficult antitrust issues are to be avoided.88
4. HEALTH CARE EXCLUSIVE DEALING AND TYING ARRANGEMENTS
Institutional health care providers, such as hospitals, frequently 
condition the purchase of some services with a requirement that 
the patient also use other services offered by the hospital. For 
example, hospitals typically require patients and admitting physi­
cians to use radiology, anesthesiology and medical laboratory serv­
ices provided by the hospital. Similarly, insurers (particularly 
HMOs and PPOs) require insureds to use only specified providers 
or forfeit some or all insurance benefits, and may limit a provider’s 
right to treat patients other than those belonging to the insured 
group. Similar practices in other industries raise antitrust issues 
analyzed under the labels o f “ exclusive dealing” and “ tying 
arrangements.”
' I * ■ : ■
Although section 3 o f the Clayton Act regulating exclusive 
dealing arrangements that might tend to lessen competition or cre­
ate a monopoly in any line of commerce is limited to transactions 
involving “goods or commodities,”89 the practice may also come 
within the Sherman Act90 and the Federal Trade Commission Act91
88 For an extensive analysis of the issue of “capacity to conspire” in 
health care cases, see Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 56, at 39-52.
89 15 U.S.C. § 14.
- 90 See Twin City Sportservice,Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 676 
F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1009.
9_i FTC v. Brown Shoe Co:, 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
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which apply to exclusive dealing in services as well as goods and 
commodities. Tying arrangements, a variety o f exclusive dealing 
whereby a consumer is forced to buy one product or service to 
obtain another, may raise issues under section 3 of. the Clayton 
Act, section 1 o f the Sherman Act and section 5 o f the Federal 
Trade Commission Act. Both practices have raised complex issues 
in the context Of antitrust review of conduct involved in providing 
health care services and are likely to raise difficult issues for reso­
lution by legislation promising reform.
For example, in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. 
Hyde,92 the plaintiff challenged the denial o f his application to 
provide anesthesiology services at the defendant hospital. The 
hospital had entered into an exclusive dealing contract with a firm 
of anesthesiologists to provide anesthesiology services for all 
patients at the hospital, thereby^foreclosing competing providers 
of the service from offering the service at the hospital. The Court 
analyzed the effect o f the contract in two “ markets” : first, the 
market for consumers of medical service, and second, the market 
for providers of anesthesiology services. In the first market, the 
contract was analyzed as a tying arrangement because patients at 
the hospital needing the service were forced to use the services of 
the firm the hospital had contracted with. In the second market, 
the case was analyzed as an exclusive dealing case. In both mar­
kets, the Court found no violation because the hospital lacked 
market power for hospital services in the geographic market and a 
substantial volume o f commerce was not foreclosed by the 
restraint.93 Whether described as a tying arrangement or a pack­
aged sale, the requirement that patients at the hospital use the serv­
w 466 U.S. 2 (1984). :
93 The hospital had approximately 30% of the general hospital mar­
ket in the East Bank area of Jefferson Parish. Under the Clayton Act, a 
23% market share was considered sufficient to raise the risk that an 
exclusive dealing arrangement may tend to lessen competition. See Stan­
dard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). The Jefferson Parish 
case had to be brought under the Sherman Act because the products 
involved were services, not goods or commodities.
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ices provided by the contract provider was found not to injure 
competition because patients werel free to use the services; of other 
hospitals using other anesthesiologists.94 In the absence o f evi­
dence demonstrating an injury to competition in anesthesiology 
services, the Court was unwilling to infer that the practice unrea­
sonably restrained trade.95
94 466 U.S. at 25. The presence of market power can result in a find­
ing of violation. See Oltz v. St. Peter’s Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440 
(9th Cir. 1988) (excluding a nurse anesthesiologist found unlawful where 
hospital had 84% of general surgical market in Helena, Montana). The 
absence of market power in the hands of an HMO was found to under­
mine claims of an unlawful boycott by allergists terminated by the HMO 
for ordering excessive tests in Hassan v. Independent Practice Ass’n, 
P.C., 698 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Mich. 1988). The definition of product and 
geographic markets is considered crucial to the determination of “power.” 
See Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473 (7th Cir.
1988), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 852 (upholding dismissal of exclusive deal­
ing case for pathology services at a hospital by defining the product mar­
ket as competition between pathologists and the geographic market as 
national market for pathologists). The problem is more complex however 
than a deductive process of first defining markets and, then measuring 
“power” in the markets involved by a measurement of market share or 
some other quantitative standard. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech­
nical Services, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992), the Court approached the 
problem of identifying “power” inductively by requiring a factual analy­
sis of the reality of the industry and practices involved, rather than pre­
suming the concept of “power” could be determined by the dictates of a 
model divorced from the reality of the business involved in the case. The 
concepts of “ market” and “power” should be understood as analytical 
means to the end of determining whether the policies o f the law have 
been violated. See John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy and the Concept o f a 
Competitive Process, 35 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 893 (1990).
95 The conclusion in Jefferson Parish that patients were free to use 
the services of other hospitals if they wished to use anesthesiologists 
other than those given the exclusive right to provide such services at Jef­
ferson Parish Hospital, assumes that consumers knew of the exclusive 
dealing contract at the hospital and were free to choose some other hospi­
tal for their surgery. The latter assumption includes the assumption that 
the patient’ s surgeon was able to practice at competing hospitals. Assum­
ing both facts may no longer be permissible after the Eastman Kodak
case requiring a trial of the facts of the dispute rather than the assump­
tions of f  act a particular judge may hold.
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Jefferson Parish did not immunize exclusive dealing and tying 
arrangements in health care from antitrust review,96 particularly 
where one can show that the anticompetitive effect o f the arrange­
ment is due to market power of the party imposing the restraint. In 
Key Enterprises o f Delaware, Inc. v. Venice Hospital,91 the court 
o f appeals reinstated a treble damage verdict awarded to a vendor 
o f home medical equipment that claimed that an exclusive dealings 
arrangement between the dominant local hospital (approximately 
80% of hospital admissions in the area) and a vendor steering 
home medical equipment supply business98 to the joint venturer 
violated sections 1 and 2 o f the Sherman Act. The court likened 
the arrangement to a reciprocal dealing arrangement and held 
“ that where a plaintiff ’s evidence shows that one party has suffi­
cient market power to unduly influence a second party to treat the 
first more favorably than the free market would otherwise dictate,
■ '-------- 1-------------------------------*------------ —--------------  -
Market failure due to imperfect information, as well as third-party pay­
ment, make tying practices in health care both attractive to providers and 
pernicious for consumers and third-party payors. See R. Craswell, Tying 
Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 
62 B.U. L. Rev . 661, 671 (1982) (tying and imperfect information).
96 See Blue Shield o f Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982) 
(upholding standing of a consumer to sue for Blue Shield’s refusal to 
reimburse plaintiff for psychotherapy services provided by a psychologist 
unless the treatment was provided by a psychiatrist dr was billed through 
and supervised by a physician). The underlying claim in this case alleged 
a conspiracy between Blue Shield and physicians to exclude and boycott 
clinical psychologists from receiving compensation under Blue Shield 
plans. "
97 919 F,2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated and reh’g granted, 979 
F.2d 806 (11th Cir. 1992).
98 The market involved is called a “durable medical equipment” 
(DME) market and includes prosthetic devices, hospital beds, oxygen 
equipment, wheelchairs and walkers. The joint venturer supplier was 
given exclusive access to its co-venturer hospital’s patients needing such 
services, and hospital personnel were instructed to steer DME business to 
the defendant supplier. After 2 years of the joint venture operation, plain­
tiff’s market share had dropped from 72.8% of the DME market to 30% 
and the defendant supplier had jumped from a 9.2% market share to 61% 
of the market, despite providing inferior service. 919 F.2d at 1555.
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and the second party acts in conformity with the reciprocal 
arrangement, the plaintiff has proved the existence of an arrange­
ment which unreasonably restrains trade.”99 The court also sus­
tained findings o f a conspiracy to monopolize and an attempt to 
monopolize the market involved through use o f the reciprocal 
dealing arrangement effectively displacing the competitive proc­
ess for determining success or failure in the market for home 
medical equipment.100
Cases have also arisen challenging exclusive dealing arrange­
ments imposed by insurance carriers on providers.101 For example, 
in Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield o f Kansas,102 the Tenth Cir­
cuit upheld a treble damage verdict against the defendant Blue 
Cross for cutting off a large Wichita hospital from participating 
provider status with Blue Cross after the hospital was acquired by 
Hospital Corporation of America (HCA). HCA also operated a 
highly successful HMO in the area and competed with Blue Cross 
in the health care insurance business. The jury found that Blue 
Cross had conspired with competing hospitals to cut off the HCA 
hospital’s participating provider status in violation of section 1 of 
the Sherman Act and that the defendant had violated section 2 
o f the Act by using its power in the health insurance market 
(approximately 60% in Kansas) to injure a competing insurance 
carrier.103 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding sufficient evidence
»  919 F.2d at 1562.
100 For similar cases involving alleged restraints in medical equip­
ment markets, see M & M Medical Supplies & Services, Inc. v. Pleasant 
Valley Hospital, Inc., 981 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1992); Advanced Health­
Care Services, Inc. v. Radford Community Hospital, 910 F.2d 139 (4th 
Cir. 1990).
101 For a thoughtful review of the cases and the issues involved in 
such circumstances, see Miller, supra note 37.
102 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990).
*io3 Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360 (D.
Kan. 1987), aff’d and remanded, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990), cert,
denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1991).
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to support the section 1 finding o f conspiracy and that Blue 
Cross’ 60% share of the insurance market in Kansas was suffi­
cient to establish market power. The court also found that Blue 
Cross’ practice of dealing only with hospitals unaffiliated with 
competing insurers did in fact injure competition.104
While other cases have refused to find that exclusive dealing 
contracts in the health care field injure competition in either 
health care insurance markets or the providing of health care serv- 
ices,105 it is likely that more cases will arise* in the future with the 
growth of HMOs and PPOs and the drive toward “ managed com­
petition” in health care markets. The crucial analytical concept 
in both exclusive dealing and tying cases is “power” ; a func­
tional concept in the analysis o f several categories o f antitrust dis­
putes linking the normative goals underlying antitrust policy to
the facts of particular cases,106 the language o f the particular law 
' - .  ^ . ■ _________  .____________________________________________________
104 «\ye ]jave difficulty in concluding that Blue Cross’ total con­
duct in this case—threatening to terminate Wesley’s contracting provider 
agreement and reducing the maximum allowable payments for the 
remaining . . .  hospitals, thereby coercing other hospitals into not doing 
business with Blue Cross competitors—constitute wilful maintenance of 
its monopoly power. A  general intent to do so is amply supported by the 
record.” 899 F.2d at 973.
los See, e.g., Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st 
Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 471 .U.S. 1029 (1985); Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. 
v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc^784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986).
106 Determining the relevance, meaning and application of the words 
of rules and the concepts they invoke to the facts of disputes cannot be 
sensibly accomplished without first determining— among other things—: 
the purpose of the rules. Robert Bork correctly observed in The Anti­
trust Par ad o x , 50 (1978): “Antitrust policy cannot be made rational 
until we are able to give a firm answer to one question: What is the point 
of the law—what are its goals? Everything else follows from the answer 
we give.” On the other hand, Bork’s advocacy of the, narrow goal of 
“maximization of consumer welfare” as defined by neoclassical eco­
nomic theory and the use of a formalistic methodology for analyzing 
antitrust disputes, is inconsistent with the legislative history of the 
antitrust laws establishing broader purposes for the law than maximizing 
“consumer welfare” and modern understandings of the is and ought of 
legal reasoning. See Flynn, supra note 94.
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invoked107 and the practical consequences of finding or not find­
ing the existence o f power in the particular case and generally.108 
Depending on the theory o f liability, the concept o f power can be 
either a quantitative concept requiring proof o f markets and a 
large market share109 or it can be used as a qualitative concept for 
determining whether, under the facts and circumstances unique to 
a dispute, the competitive process is being displaced as the means 
for determining entrepreneurial success or failure in the private 
economic realm and consumer freedom to choose goods and serv­
ices free o f coercion displacing the competitive process determin­
ing choice.110 Health care antitrust cases frequently involve
107 The concept of “power” may have different meanings depending 
upon whether the action is a structural case brought under § 2 of the 
Sherman Act or a behavioral case brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act 
or § 3 of the Gayton Act. While the majority opinion in Kodak defined 
power as “ the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output,” 
112 S. Ct, 2081, the concept is often used in the context of practices 
excluding competitors as well. See Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, 
Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
108 Some of the particular and general consequences o f the Kodak 
decision are explored in George A . Hay, Is the Glass Half-Empty or Half­
Full? Reflections on the Kodak Case, 62 A ntitrust L.J. 177 (1993); 
Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Information 
Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 A ntitrust L.J. 
193 (1993); Gordon V. Spivack & Carolyn T. Ellis, Kodak: Enlightened 
Antitrust Analysis and Traditional Tying Law, 62 A ntitrust L.J. 203 
(1993).
109 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); 
International Salt Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1947).
110 Thus in Kodak, Kodak could be found to have economic power 
over the customers of its machines if it could be found to “force a pur­
chaser to do something he would not do in a competitive market.” 112 S. 
Ct. at 2080. The concept “power” is being used in such circumstances to 
link the goals underlying antitrust policy to the facts of the case and the 
consequences of permitting or not permitting the practice in question. As 
in, other practices denominated “per se” violations, the inquiry is directed 
to whether the practice is one displacing a competitive process determin­
ing the success or failure of competitors or the freedom of consumers to 
choose goods and services on the basis of price and quality.
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restraints demonstrating the use of both meanings of power to find 
that conduct constitutes an unlawful exclusive dealing, tying 
arrangement or other form of anticompetitive conduct.111 Conse­
quently, any reform of health care financing and delivery o f serv­
ices must be sensitive to both forms of power and the variety of 
contexts where antitrust policy is said to be violated by the unjus­
tified exercise jifLpower displacing the competitive process.
5. HEALTH CARE MERGERS AND JOINT VENTURES In most areas of 
the country there is a significant excess supply o f hospital 
space;112 an excess caused in part by many decades of paying for
It is an example of antitrust policy being loyal to its roots. For exam­
ple, in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 
1898), defendant manufacturers 6f cast-iron pipe engaged in a price- 
fixing contract sought to justify their agreement as a “ reasonable” 
contract on the ground that it only applied to 30% of the capacity for 
cast-iron pipe in the country and that such a partial restraint was for the 
legitimate purpose of preventing ruinous competition. Justice Taft held 
that “ no conventional restraint of trade can be enforced uhless the 
covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a law­
ful contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of 
the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of 
an unjust use of those fruits by the other party. . . . [T]he covenant must 
be one in which there is a main purpose, to which the covenant in 
restraint of trade is ^ nerely ancillary.” 85 Fed. at 282.
Kodak’s insistence that purchasers of its machines use Kodak sup­
plied parts and repair services, was a covenant imposed on purchasers of 
machines without justification and denying them the freedom to use other 
suppliers of services and parts and excluded competing suppliers of serv­
ice and parts. As such it is a case where market definitions and “power” 
are being used as tools for a qualitative analysis to explore the facts and 
circumstances of the dispute in view of a broader complex of goals than 
that admitted by analyzing the case in light of the narrow goals of a 
model. See Lande, supra note 108.
111 Compare Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 
U.S. 2 (1984), with Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. 1842
(1991).
112 There has been a significant decline in hospital occupancy rates 
from a 72%-76% rate in the 1970s to rates running from 50%-63% in the 
1980s. See Jonathan B. Baker, The Antitrust Analysis o f Hospital Merg-
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hospital costs on a fee-for-service reimbursement insurance sys­
tem thereby providing little or no incentive for doctors or patients 
to minimize or limit the use o f hospital facilities and services 
being paid for by third-party insurance. In the 1970s, it was 
believed that the incentives to build excess hospital capacity 
could be controlled by requiring governmental approval before 
construction projects or major equipment purchases were under­
taken by requiring Certificates of Need (CON).113 Federal incen­
tives for state CON regulation were abandoned in the 1980s with 
the shift to reimbursement for federally funded health care pro­
grams on a prospective payment basis instead o f a fee-for-service 
one.114
The combination o f excess capacity, the growing shift from 
cost-plus reimbursement to prospective payment for services and 
a growing overcapacity with the removal o f government limita­
tions upon new hospital construction by abolishing CON regula­
tion triggered a hospital merger movement during the 1980s.115 
The trend of the 1980s appears to be building into a “surge” in the 
1990s in light o f the prospects o f a major overhaul o f health care 
financing accompanied by significant cost Controls threatening 
the earning power o f hospitals operating at less than efficient 
capacity.116
ers and the Transformation o f the Hospital Industry, 51 La w  &  C ontemp. 
Probs, 93, 98 n.27 (1988).
113 The National Health Planning & Resources Development Act of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225(1975).
114 See Baker, supra note 112, at 97-98.
115 Id.: “Hospital mergers, once rare in the United States, have grown 
commonplace in the current decade. During the early 1980s, acquisitions 
or consolidations occurred at the rate of roughly two hundred per year, 
dramatically higher than the yearly rates of fifty in 1972 anejfive in
1 9 6 L ”  ■■■ ' - t
116 See George Anders, Merger o f Hospitals Surge Amid Pressures to 
Cut Costs, W all St . J., Dec. 1, 1993, at B l, col. 1, stating that “ [m]erger 
mania is sweeping through the nation’ s 5,400 acute-care hospitals” in 
light of the need to “avoid the costs of duplicating services” and be more
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While there has been some controversy over the Clayton Act’s * 
section 7 jurisdiction of the FTC over asset acquisitions by non­
profit entities,117 to the extent that section 7 o f the Clayton Act
responsive to “ the needs of managed-care entities. . . It should be 
noted, that there is also a trend of mergers by suppliers of health products 
and services raising antitrust issues. See Roche Holding Ltd., 5 Trade 
Reg. Rep. (CCH) H 22,879 (F.T.C. 1990) (holding that a pharmaceutical 
company acquisition of Genentech, Inc., a biotechnology company, 
required divestiture of certain product lines); E-Z-EM, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. 
Rep. (CCH) H 22,859 (F.T.C. 1990) (finding that an acquisition of one 
barium diagnostic product firm by another required divestiture); Amer- 
sham International pic, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 11 22,838 (F.T.C. 1990) 
(deciding that acquisition of firm manufacturing radioactive compounds 
for use in brain scanning technologies requiring divestiture).
117 See Baker, supra note 112, at 112-13; Miles, Hospital Mergers 
and the Antitrust Laws: An Overview, 29 A ntitrust Bull . 253 (1984); 
Note, Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94 Harv . L. Re v . 802 (1981). In 
United States v. Carilion Health Sys.,^707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989), 
aff’d, unpublished opinion, 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 19851), the district 
court held that § 7 does not apply to the merger of two nonprofit hospi­
tals. The argument is based on the fact that there is no stock acquisition 
in acquisitions of nonprofits and the acquisition is usually a pure asset 
acquisition. Section 4 of the FTC Act excludes FTC jurisdiction over 
nonprofits and it was argued that this means the language of § 7 limiting 
jurisdiction over asset acquisitions to those by persons “ subject to the 
jurisdiction” of the FTC deprived the FTC of jurisdiction. The unpub­
lished circuit-court opinion in Carilion affirmed the lower court finding 
of no violation on other grounds and did not reach the question of 
whether § 7 applies to asset acquisitions by nonprofit hospitals.
Judge Posner, in United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 
1278 (7th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 920, was confronted with the 
same issue and rejected the argument that the FTC lacks jurisdiction over 
asset acquisitions by nonprofits. He found that the language in § 7 refer­
ring to FTC jurisdiction was referring to the FTC’s jurisdiction defined 
by § 11 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21, and not that defined in § 4 of 
the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44. Posner held, however, that since the gov- 
erriment failed to raise the argument and analysis of statutory language 
that Posner discovered, the government waived the argument and could 
not proceed on a Clayton Act § 7 theory, but could rely only on a Sher­
man Act § 1 claim that the merger constituted an unreasonable restraint 
of trade. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently upheld FTC jurisdiction over 
nonprofit asset acquisitions on the theory suggested by Judge Posner in 
FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
/
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does apply, it is a potentially significant barrier to hospital merg­
ers and acquisitions.118 In a hospital merger or acquisition case, 
geographic and product markets are narrowly defined due to the 
localized nature of hospital services119 and the tendency of most 
hospitals to provide overlapping services or a “ cluster” o f over­
lapping services.120 Many local health care markets are concen­
trated to begin with, and further acquisitions are likely to meet
118 In the Rockford case, supra note 117, the market share of the two 
merged hospitals in the Rockford area amounted to between 64% and 
72% and the estimated three-firm market share was 90%; concentration 
ratios clearly sufficient to prove a § 7 violation if the court had applied 
the incipiency standard found in § 7. Judge Posner upheld a finding that 
this large percentage of market share for the merged firms and the con­
centration ratio in the market constituted a violation of § 1 of the Sher­
man Act because it made it easier for the firms “ to collude.” In the course 
of reaching this conclusion, Posner suggested that the test for proving a 
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and the test for proving a violation of 
§ 7 of the Clayton Act were the same: “Both statutes as currently under­
stood prevent transactions likely to reduce competition substantially,” 
898 F.2d at 1283, and that the claim that § 7 prevents “probable restraints 
and section 1 actual ones is word play.” Id. (emphasis in original). Such 
a holding, equating § 7’s incipiency standard with ease o f collusion, 
appears contrary to the purpose for amending § 7 in 1950 and to the 
express wording of the statute. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 
U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962); David  M artin, M ergers and the Clayton A ct 
(1959).
119 See Baker, supra note 112, at 141-48; Michael A. Morrisey et al., 
Defining Geographic Markets for Hospital Care, 51 L aw  &  C ontemp. 
Probs. 165 (1988).
120 See Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 
1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987) (holding that an acquisition of 
four hospitals in Chattanooga, Tennessee measured in terms o f the* hospi­
tal market in Chattanooga reduced number of competitive hospitals from
11 to 7 and raised the acquiring firm’s market share from 14% to 26%; 
raised the four-firm concentration ratio from 79% to 91%; FTC finding 
that the acquisition may tend to lessen competition, upheld in opinion by 
Posner, J.). The “cluster of.services” approach for defining product mar­
kets first arose in United States v. Philadelphia Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 
356-57 (1963). While it is an attractive approach for dealing with prod­
uct market definitions in hospital acquisitions, it does pose some difficul­
ties. See Baker, supra note 112, at 123-^ -40.
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whatever standard is relied upon to prove a particular acquisition 
heightens concentration and facilitates collusion.121 Consequently, 
in undoing the incentives'to overbuild capacity and increase the 
efficient use of local hospital facilities, section 7 may become a 
significant factor in constraining mergers and acquisitions, unless 
defenses like the failing firm defense come into play, or specific 
federal legislation mandates otherwise and specifically exempts 
hospital mergers-from section 7 of the Clayton Act.122
121 See Ukiah Valley Medical Ctr. v. FTC, 911 F.2d 261 (9th Cir.
1990) (court refused to enjoin FTC decision to proceed with a complaint 
against an asset acquisition by one hospital (43 beds) in Ukiah, California 
of the assets of another (51 beds) in the same area giving the acquiring 
firm a 90% plus market share in acute hospital services in Mendocino 
and Lake Counties); FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th 
Cir. 1991), 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 11 23,218 (1992) (upholding pro­
posed consent order barring acquisition (630-point rise in Herfindahl- 
Hirschman index (H H I) to 3200) In acute care hospital market in 
Augusta, Georgia area as result of merger challenged by the FTC); 
Columbia Hospital Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1MI 23,333, 23,450, 
23,475 & 23,476 (F.T.C. 1993) (complaint challenging acute care hospi­
tal acquisition in three-county area of Florida and consent order divesting 
control of hospital); Maine v. Cardiovascular & Thoracic Associates, 
1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 69,985 (Sup. Ct., Kennebec Co. 1992) (con­
sent decree in state case to enjoin conduct by merged firm providing 60% 
of the cardiac surgery in only medical facility in southern Maine). See 
also Nelson v. Monroe Regional Medical Ctr., 925 F.2d 1555 (7th Cir.
1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 285 (upholding standing of treble damage 
claimant denied service after acquisition of clinic where plaintiff was 
treated in the past in a highly concentrated local health care market).
122 A  complex state action issue may be arising with the adoption of 
state laws authorizing horizontal agreements by hospitals and other 
health care providers for sharing or allocating facilities or programs, lab­
oratories, etc., between competing hospitals. See 12 M. Rev . Stat. title 
22, §§ 1881-1888 (1991); 7 M inn . Stat. A nnot. § 62J.29 (1992); Ohio 
Rev . Code A n n . title 37, § 3727.21-.24 (Page 199^); W ash. Rev. C ode 
title 70, § 70.44.450 (1992); 1992 Wis. Legis. Serv., Act 250 (West). 
North Dakota recently adopted a similar law permitting cooperative 
agreements among health care providers subject to review by the State 
Department of Health and Consolidated Laboratories. See 65 ATRR 
(BNA) No. 1622, at 63 (July 8,1993). ;
(footnote 122 continued)
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To date, the enforcement agencies have used section 7 spar­
ingly except where acquisitions raise significantly concentration 
ratios in local acute care hospital markets.123 Adoption of federal 
health care legislation mandating “managed care” and the collec­
tivization o f providers and consumers into bargaining groups, 
however, should accelerate the trend to eliminate excess hospital 
capacity and excessive duplication o f services and equipment 
either by mergers or by joint ventures. In anticipation of the grow­
ing pressure to rationalize excess hospital, medical equipment and 
physician service capacity, the enforcement agencies have issued 
Enforcement Policy Statements in the Health Care Area124 spell­
ing out “ safety zones” for six areas: (1) hospital mergers; (2) hos­
pital joint ventures sharing expensive high technology or 
equipment; (3) the collection and dissemination of information by 
physicians designed to influence practice parameters; (4 ) 
exchanges o f price and cost information by hospitals; (5) joint 
purchasing arrangements by health care providers; and (6) physi­
cian joint ventures establishing independent practice associations
In order to escape the application of overriding federal antitrust pol­
icy, such state laws must “expressly authorize” the private agreements 
put in place and “actively supervise” the market divisions adopted. Most 
retain jurisdiction in the state’s attorney general to review agreements 
and to revoke the arrangement. Whether “ active supervision” must 
include supervision of the rates charged by what may become a 
monopoly over certain categories of care upon an agreement dividing up 
local hospital services, is unclear. It is doubtful that legislative state­
ments, like Ohio’ s, of an intent that state officials provide “direction, 
supervision and control over approved cooperative agreements,” O hio 
Rev . Code A n n . title 37, § 3727.24, is “ supervision” of the sort required 
for state action immunity. Intending supervision and providing active and 
objective supervision are quite different things after the Ticor case, 
F.T.C. v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992). The issue 
may be coming to a head with the proposal of the three major hospitals in 
Portland, Maine to combine operations under supervision of a holding 
company and eliminate duplicative services. See Hospital Plan in Maine 
Tests Antitrust Law, W all St. J., Aug. 25, 1993, at B l.
123 See cases cited supra note 121.
124 The policies may be found in 64 ATRR (BNA) No. 1631 Special 
Supplement (Sept. 16,1993).
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(IPAs), PPOs and similar joint ventures to market services Jo 
group insurance and similar plans. Although well intended, it is 
difficult to assess the utility of the “policy statements” other than 
to suggest that mergers and joint ventures on their face are not 
illegal unless they threaten to or actually tend to lessen competi­
tion or tend to create a monopoly— in other words, violate the 
standards of section 7 presently in place.
Overcapacity and duplication of services has also led to a 
widespread and growing use of joint ventures in health care mar­
kets.125 While joint ventures may make economic and practical 
sense in many circumstances, they may also become the vehicle 
for fixing prices, dividing customer and geographic markets or the 
monopolization o f a category of goods or services.126 Cases have 
arisen, for example, where hospitals have entered into “joint ven­
125 The concept of a “joint venture” is surely a friendlier label than 
the concept “combination in restraint of trade,” although joint ventures 
are “combinations” and may well “restrain trade” in some or all of their 
activities. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Okla­
homa, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 
U.S. 131 (1969); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
The “joint venture” label is usually applied where the joint action pro­
duces a new product or service. The combination or conspiracy in 
restraint of trade label is usually applied where there is no new product or 
service being provided by virtue of the joint activity. Both concepts have 
the potential to mask the factual differences underlying their appropriate 
uses.
Concepts should be recognized in law as functional tools of analysis 
to link facts to rules in light of policies and practical consequences and 
not as wooden premises of deductive logic to dictate results without 
regard for facts. See generally Flynn, supra note 94; Felix S. Cohen, 
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum . L. 
Rev. 809 (1935).. • ' . -V . • -
126 See Kevin Grady, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis o f Health 
Care Joint Ventures, 61 A ntitrust L.J. 765 (1993). For a broad review of 
antitrust regulation of joint ventures, see Joseph Brodley, Joint Ventures 
and Antitrust Policy, 95 Harv . L. Rev . 1523 (1982); Donald I. Baker, 
Compulsory Access to Network Joint Ventures Under the Sherman Act: 
Rules or Roulette?, 1993 U tah L. Rev . 999.
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tures” or exclusive dealing arrangements with suppliers o f home 
medical equipment needed by patients discharged from the hospi­
tal unlawfully excluding competing suppliers from the market.127 
Although the parties labeled their practice a “joint venture,” no 
new product or service was created by the joint effort. The market 
power o f the hospital over its patients was being used to steer 
patients to its partner in the home health care market, a combina­
tion in restraint of trade in home health care markets rather than a 
laudable “joint venture” producing some new service or product.
Despite antitrust concerns with combinations in restraint o f 
trade masking as “joint ventures” and competition reducing joint 
ventures, there is considerable discussion concerning the legitima­
tion o f the widespread use o f joint ventures. Some states have 
sought to exempt local joint ventures from federal antitrust scrutiny 
by special legislation affirmatively authorizing health care joint 
ventures.128 Some states have adopted legislation imposing rate 
regulation on hospitals, presumably a way of controlling monop­
oly pricing power that might arise out o f hospital mergers or 
joint ventures monopolizing particular categories of treatment or 
equipment.129 State legislation simply exempting local joint ven­
127 See Key Enterprises o f Delaware, Inc. v. Venice Hospital, 979 
F.2d 806 (11th Cir. 1990); Advanced Health-Care Services, Inc. v. Rad­
ford Community Hospital, 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990); M & M Medical 
Supplies & Serv., Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hospital, Inc., 981 F.2d 160 
(4th Cir. 1992). 1
128 See state statutes cited supra, note 122. I
129 The degree and methodology of rate regulation imposed varies con­
siderably in those states adopting this approach to controlling hospital 
costs. See 6 Conn. Gen. Stats, ch. 368c, §§ 19a-145, et seq. (1993); 1992 
Fla. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 92-33, §§ 408.001, et seq. (West); 12 M. Rev . 
Stat. A nn . tit. 22, §§381, et seq. (1992); M d . Code A nn . §§ 19-201, et 
seq. (1990); M ass. L aws A nn ., ch. 6A, §§ 31, et seq. (1988); NJ. Stat. 
A nn . §§ 26-2H-1, et seq.; N.Y. Law  A n n . §§ 2897, et seq. (Consol. 1993);
8 O r. Rev. Stat. §§ 442.400, et seq. (1990); 5 W. V a . Code A nn . §§ 16- 
29B-1 (1991). Hospital rate regulation authority in Washington and Wiscon­
sin has been repealed. The complexities of rate regulating hospitals and the 
different approaches followed in other countries are extensively reviewed
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tures from antitrust policy is not sufficient to immunize the anti­
competitive consequences of a state-authorized joint venture from 
federal antitrust policy. In Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor 
Title Insurance Co.,130 the Supreme Court held that for a state reg­
ulatory policy to exempt conduct from federal antitrust policy, it 
must specifically exempt the anticompetitive conduct in question 
from antitrust policy and the state must “ actively supervise” the 
exempted conduct. The Court defined “ active supervision” as 
requiring determination of:
whether the state has exercised sufficient independent judgment and 
control so that the details of the rates or prices have been established 
as a product of deliberate state intervention, not simply by agreement 
among private parties. . . . [T]he analysis asks whether the State has 
played a substantial role in determining the specifics o f the economic 
policy. The question is not how well state regulation works but 
whether the anticompetitive scheme is the State’s own.131
The mere potential of state supervision by way of a veto o f the 
privately set rates is not sufficient supervision of the conduct to 
make it the state’s own.132 Consequently, state laws authorizing
in W illiam  A . G laser , Paying  the H ospital: T he O rganization , D ynam ­
ics a n d  E ffects of D iffering F inancial A rrangements (1987).
*3° 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992).
131 112 S. Ct. at 2177. The Court explained its insistence upon “active 
supervision” as necessary to insure that the states “ accept political 
responsibility for actions they intend to undertake” and that where states 
“choose to displace the free market with regulation, our insistence on real 
compliance with both parts of the . . . [state action] test will serve to 
make clear that the State is responsible for the price fixing it has sanc­
tioned and undertaken to control.” Id. at 2178.
132 In Ticor, the Court held: “Where prices or rates are set as an ini­
tial matter by private parties, subject only to a veto if the State chooses to 
exercise it, the party claiming the immunity must show that state officials 
have undertaken the necessary steps to determine the specifics of the 
price-fixing or ratesetting scheme. The mere potential for state supervi­
sion is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State.” 112 S. Ct. 
at 2179. '
In two of the state regulatory programs under review in Ticor, state 
“review” of the rates set was by a “negative option” by which the rates
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health care joint ventures having anticompetitive effects must 
include a mechanism for active and independent state supervision 
of the conduct restraining trade rather than just a potential veto by 
state officials to escape review under federal antitrust standards.
An analogous issue may arise at the federal level with the 
adoption of health care reform legislation under the doctrines of 
primary, concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction where federal 
health care legislation authorizes conduct impinging upon the 
ideal o f a competitive process without spelling out how antitrust 
policy is altered or amended.133 A  key part of “managed competi­
tion” proposals is the collectivization o f providers into groups 
to bargain with organized consumer buying groups. A  major set of 
issues that w ill need to be spelled out in some detail by any 
reform proposal is the degree to which provider groups may 
be organized as joint ventures and engage in exclusive dealing 
arrangements and the extent to which such joint ventures will
came into effect if the state regulatory agency did not veto them within a 
specified time. There was no evidence of independent state review of the 
rates set for anything other than mathematical accuracy in the two states 
having a negative option scheme of review. In two states where there was 
some evidence of independent review by a state regulatory authority, the 
Court remanded for further proceedings on the question of whether the 
“ supervision” was “ active supervision.”
133 The doctrines of primary, exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction in 
such circumstances are explored in Louis B. Schw artz et a l ., supra note 
14, at 798-809. The analogy to the judicially created state action defense 
should not be pressed too far because the issues do not involve a weigh­
ing of federalism concerns but involve questions of legislative intent fo 
displace competition where Congress has not clearly addressed the cir­
cumstances at issue. The courts have fashioned a process of reconciling 
the particular scope of regulation imposed with the generalized policy of 
relying upon a competitive process found in the antitrust laws under the 
concepts of primary, exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction. For an excel­
lent example of the analytical process followed, see Judge Greene’s opin­
ion in an early phase of the AT& T antitrust case leading up to the 
breakup of AT&T, United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph 
Co., 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1320-30 (D.D.C. 1978), excerpt quoted infra 
note 136.
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be subject to antitrust constraints or some form of affirmative reg­
ulatory supervision.134 ,
III. Health care reform legislation
It is an understatement to observe that there is a general con­
sensus, at least among the public, that the financing, structure, 
and operation of the health care delivery system is in need of sig­
nificant reform.13S Whichever framework for reform is put in 
place must take account o f the assumption that either antitrust 
policy regulates the structure o f and conduct in the health care 
industry, or that affirmative regulation o f both is imposed, or 
some combination of antitrust and regulation are imposed on the 
industry. The interrelationship of antitrust and affirmative regula­
tion must be spelled out and sensitively supervised, lest it be held 
that antitrust policy applies in the absence of a clear intent to pro­
vide otherwise or a gap is opened up where neither the antitrust 
laws nor affirmative government regulation applies.136 It is doubt-
134 An excellent beginning point for an analysis of many of the issues 
raised by health care joint ventures is Grady, supra note 126. See also 
Robert J. Enders, An Introduction to Special Antitrust Issues in Health 
Care Provider Joint Ventures, 61 A ntitrust L.J. 805 (1993).
135 Theodore R. Marmor & Michael S. Barr, Making Sense o f the 
National Health Insurance Reform Debate, 10 Y ale L. & Po l ’y Rev . 
228, n.5 (1992) (reporting that 89% of the public agree that the U.S. 
health care system is in need of “ fundamental change” or “ complete 
rebuilding”); see also Edward A. Goeas III, Health Care: The Issue for 
the Nineties, 10 Y a l eX. & Pol’ y Rev . 220 (1992).
136 Judge Greene in United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F. 
Supp. 1314,1320-30 (D.D.C. 1978), holding FCC regulation did not oust 
antitrust jurisdiction over alleged monopolization of the telephone indus­
try by AT& T, spelled out the analytical methodology as follows: 
“Broadly speaking the antitrust laws are rooted in the proposition that the 
public interest is best protected by competition, free from artificial 
restraints such as price-fixing and monopoly. The theory of regulation, 
on the other hand, presupposes that with respect to certain areas of eco­
nomic activity the judgment of expert agencies may produce results supe­
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fill that the public or segments of the industry would long put up 
with a gap where neither antitrust policy nor regulation control 
pricing discretion, resource allocation or market access by 
providers. The failure of a competitive process to function in sev­
eral areas o f health care and subject those failures to regulation by 
the competitive process or some form o f affirmative regulation 
has led to rapid inflation of costs. In addition, the failure to 
enforce competition or impose regulation has led to inequities in 
the distribution of resources and the rapid growth of health care 
antitrust litigation over the past decade reviewed in the first part 
of this article.
A  fundamental issue with widespread antitrust-regulatory 
implications is how will health care be financed to balance goals 
of equity reflected by the now widely held assumption that uni­
versal access to health care be provided for all and the demand for 
efficiency in the delivery o f health care services if we are to
rior to those of the marketplace, and that for this reason competition in a 
particular industry will not necessarily serve the public interest.
“The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that ‘ repeals of antitrust 
laws by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and 
have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust 
and regulatory provisions.’
“Regulated industries are not per se exempt from the Sherman Act, 
and they are not necessarily exempt even if the conduct complained of in 
an antitrust context has been expressly approved by the agency charged 
with regulating the particular industry.
“Regulated conduct is, however, deemed to be immune by implication 
from the antitrust laws in two relatively narrow instances: ( 1) when a reg­
ulatory agency has, with congressional approval, exercised explicit 
authority over the challenged practice itself (as distinguished from the 
general subject matter) in such a way that antitrust enforcement would 
interfere with regulation, and (2) when regulation by an agency over an 
industry or some of its components or practices is so pervasive that 
Congress is assumed to have determined competition to be an inadequate 
means of vindicating the public interest.”
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afford universal access without curbing innovation or imposing 
undue and expensive bureaucratic burdens upon the delivery of 
services. While the various options from traditional fee-for-serv- 
ice to total socialization of health care are too complex to explore 
fully here, the outlines of some of the options likely to be consid­
ered in the United States and the interplay of antitrust policy with 
them can be tentatively explored.
After extensive review of health care financing options and in 
light o f a fundamental commitment to provide universal access to 
health care services, the Clinton administration has proposed 
adoption of a “managed competition” Health Security Act;137 
a method for financing and regulating the supply of health care 
services first suggested by Professor Alain C. Enthoven.138 Under 
the proposed Clinton plan, consumers would be guaranteed com­
prehensive health care coverage,139 and be required to join a health
137 Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, S. 1757 (103d Cong., 1st Sess. 
1993). The President’s message sending the Bill to Congress may be 
found in U.S. Code C ong. &  A d . N ews, December 1993, No. 10, at D. 
37. Alternative bills have been introduced in the first session of the 103d 
Congress, including: a single payor bill, H.K\1200; a conservative 
Democratic bill avoiding mandated payments by employers, H.R. 3222; a 
bipartisan bill, S. 1579; a moderate Republican bill, S. 1770; and conser­
vative Republican bills, H.R. 3080 and S. 1743.
138 P rofessor A lain  E n th ov en ’ s critiqu e o f the ex istin g  system , its 
faults, and the remedy o f managed com petition are fully explored in his 
book: T heory and P ractice o f M anaged C ompetition in Health C are 
F inance (1 9 8 8 ). See also D. Y ao , Health Care Managed Competition—  
FTC Member's View, 7  Trade R eg . Rep. (CCH )H  5 0 ,1 0 0  (1 9 9 3 ).
139 Section 1001 of the Act guarantees every eligible individual a 
“ comprehensive benefit package.” Section 1101 of the Health Security 
Act, defines the scope of coverage plans must provide as including: Hos-' 
pital services (defined in § 1111); services of health professionals 
(described in § 1112); emergency and ambulatory medical and surgical 
services (described in § 1113); clinical preventive services (described in 
§ 1114); mental health and substance abuse services (described in 
§ 1115); family planning services and services for pregnant women 
(described in § 1116); hospice care (described in § 1117); home health 
care (described in § 1118); extended care services (described in § 1119);
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plan140 offered through a state-created “regional alliance”141 that 
will contract with providers organized through the intermediary of
ambulance services (described in § 1120); outpatient laboratory, radiol­
ogy, and diagnostic services (described in §1121); outpatient prescription 
drugs and biologicals (described in § 1122); outpatient rehabilitation serv­
ices (described in § 1123); durable medical equipment and prosthetic and 
orthopedic devices (described in § 1124); vision care (described in 
§ 1125); dental care (described in § 1126); health education classes 
(described in § 1127); and investigational treatments (described in 
§ 1128).
The definitions of each category of care and § 1141 of the Act defines 
several exclusions from coverage like services not medically necessary or 
appropriate, custodial care and cosmetic surgery. A National Health 
Board, created by §§ 1501-06, is to further define the scope of plan cov­
erage set forth by § 1151. Implicit in this grant of authority is the power 
to ration health care paid for by approved plans. See Ronald Dworkin, Is 
Clinton’s Plan Fair?, N.Y. R e v . B ooks, Jan. 13, 1994, at 20.
140 Section 1002 of the proposed Act provides:
(a) In General. In accordance with this Act, each eligible individ­
ual (other than a medicare-eligible individual)
(1) must enroll in an applicable health plan for the individual, and
(2) must pay any premium required, consistent with this Act, with 
respect to such enrollment.
(b) Limitation on Disenrollment. No eligible individual shall be 
disenrolled from an applicable health plan until the individual
(1) is enrolled under another applicable health plan, or
(2) becomes a medicare-eligible individual.
141 Section 1202 of the Act requires each state to establish one or 
more regional alliances. Section 1301 of the proposed Act defines a 
regional alliance as: “In this Act, the term ‘regional alliance’ means a 
non-profit organization, an independent state agency, or an agency of the 
State. . . . ”
It is envisioned that regional alliances will be of two types: state 
sanctioned multi-employer alliances and large employer alliances. Under 
§ 1321 of the Act, alliances will contract with state approved health plans 
to offer health care services to employees electing a particular plan 
offered by the alliance. Section 1322 of the proposed Act provides:
' Each health alliance must provide to each eligible enrollee with
respect to the alliance a choice of health plans among the plans
which have contracts in effect with the alliance under section
Health care : 117
state approved HMOs, PPOs, and similar group provider plans:142 
Plans are required to accept all eligible applicants143 and are pre-
1321 (in the case of a regional alliance) or section 1341 (in the 
case of a corporate alliance).
(b) Offering of Plans by Alliances.
(1) In general. Each regional alliance shall include among its 
health plan offerings at least one fee-for-service plan (as defined 
in paragraph (2)). ’
(2) Fee-for-service plan defined.
(A) In general. For purposes of this Act, the term “fee-for-service 
plan” means a health plan that
(1) provides coverage for all items and services included in the 
comprehensive benefit package that are furnished by any lawful 
health care provider of the enrollee’s choice, subject to reasonable 
restrictions (described in subparagraph (B)), and
(ii) makes payment to such a provider without regard to whether 
or not there is a contractual arrangement between the plan and the 
provider.
142 Section 1202 of the Act provides for certification of health care 
plans eligible for inclusion in the offerings by regional alliances:
(a) Criteria for Certification.
(1) In general. For purposes of this section, a participating 
State shall establish and publish the criteria that are used in the 
certification of health plans under this section. ,
(2) Requirements. Such criteria shall be established with respect to
(A) the quality of the plan, «
(B) the financial stability of the plan,
(C) the plan’s capacity to deliver the comprehensive benefit package 
in the designated service area,
(D) other applicable requirements for health plans under parts 1, 3, 
and 4 of subtitle E, and
(E) other requirements imposed by the State consistent with this part.
(b) Certification of Health Plans. A participating State shall certify 
each plan as a regional alliance health plan that it determines meet 
the criteria for certification established and published under subsec­
tion (a).
143 Health Security Act, § 1402(a) provides:
(1) In general. Subject to paragraph (2), each health plan offered 
by a regional alliance or a corporate alliance must accept for ' 
enrollment every alliance eligible individual who seeks such
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eluded from terminating coverage until the person is covered by 
another plan.144 Health insurance coverage would be financed in 
most cases by employers paying 80% of the costs and employees 
contributing up to 20% of the costs and would be bought on a 
prospective basis for a period of 1 year, with consumers free to 
chose annually among presumably competing plans, including a 
fee-for-service* option, based on quality and cost.145
Consumers choosing a group provider plan would be forced to 
limit their freedom of choice of doctors to those providing service
enrollment. No plan may engage in any practice that has the effect 
of attracting or limiting enrollees on the basis of personal charac­
teristics, such as health status, anticipated need for health care, 
age, occupation, or affiliation with any person or entity.
(2) Capacity limitations. With the approval of the applicable 
regulatory authority, a health plan may limit enrollment because 
of the plan’s capacity to deliver services dr to maintain financial 
stability. If such a limitation is imposed, the limitation may not be 
imposed on a basis referred to in paragraph (1).
144 Health Security Act, § 1402(b).
145 Id. § 1341. A variety of complex funding formulas are contained 
in the proposed Act in §§ 6021, et seq., including a requirement for pay­
ments of part of the costs by families enrolled with a regional alliance 
plan found in §§ 6101, et seq. The mandate that all employers pay 80% 
of the funding costs has raised substantial opposition from small business 
interests opposed to paying employee health care costs and may prove to 
be a significant stumbling block to adopting the Clinton plan in its pres­
ent form despite tax and other subsidies considerably reducing the burden 
for small business. See Rick Wartzman & Jeanne Saddler, Motley’s 
Crew: A Fervent Lobbyist Rallies Small Business to Battle Health Plan, 
W all  St. J., Jan. 5,1993, at 1.
Professor Enthoven’s plan, like the Clinton proposal, does not rely 
upon a totally free market, but requires “management” of the competition 
that can take place by inserting “active collective agents on the demand 
side, which I call sponsors, who contract with the competing health care 
plans and continuously structure and adjust the market to overcome its 
tendencies to failure.” E nthoven , supra note 138, at 82. Sponsors would 
serve as “the broker who structures the coverages, contracts with the 
health plan and beneficiaries regarding the rules of participation, manages 
the enrollment process, collects premium contributions from beneficiaries, 
pays premiums to health plans and administers cross subsidies among 
beneficiaries and subsidies available to the whole group.” Id. at 83.
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through the provider plan chosen by the consumer and would be 
limited to the coverage provided by the basic plan. Coverage over 
and above the basic plan would be available through supplemental 
plans consumers and/or employers would be required to finance 
on their own.146
The basic thrust of the Clinton proposal is to collectivize and 
make universal consumer access to health care through insurance 
purchasing groups financed by employers and/or government147 to 
deal with collectivized provider groups competing with each other 
for the custom of the buyer groups. Competition among the plans 
for the business of purchasing groups, it is assumed, will drive 
down or keep in check the market failure of the traditional fee- 
for-service delivery system. However, if this approach is adopted 
the areas of recent significant antitrust litigation outlined above—- 
health care financing, peer review, price fixing, exclusive dealing, 
and mergers and joint ventures—should be addressed in the legis­
lation establishing the plan. Each area is in need of more explicit 
attention in the Clinton Health Security Act if competition is to be 
“managed” to secure both equity and efficiency.148
146 Health Security Act, §§ 1421-23.
147 One acronym gaining currency to describe one form of consumer 
collective is HIPCs—Health Insurance Purchasing Cooperatives—a 
semigovernmental agency to contract with provider organizations on 
behalf of groups of small business purchasers and the otherwise unin­
sured.
148 Professor Enthoven recognizes the need to enforce antitrust policy 
if a system of managed competition is to work. See E nthoven , supra note 
138, at 122. Aside from a general recognition of the need to regulate boy­
cotts and price fixing, Enthoven does not spell out in any detail how 
antitrust policy and a system of managed competition would be inte­
grated. For some of the complexities that will inevitably arise, see Rose­
mary Gibson & John B. Reiss, Health Care Delivery and Financing: 
Competition, Regulation and Incentives, in M arket  Reform s  in  H ealth  
C are  243 et seq. (Jack A. Meyer ed., 1983); Miller, supranote 37; Mark 
V. Pauly, Competition in Health Insurance Markets, 51 La w  &  C ontem p. 
P robs. 237 (1988); Thomas Kauper, The Role o f Quality of Care Consid­
erations in Antitrust Analysis, 51 L aw  & C ontem p. P robs. 273 (1988).
(footnote 148 continued)
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While competition between plans for acceptance by a regional 
alliance is relied upon to control costs, the ability to control costs 
remains subject to cost inflation imposed by plan beneficiaries 
making excessive use of the plan. The underlying problem of mar­
ket imperfections caused by third-party payment creates the risk, 
and the Health Security Act proposes complex premium caps149 
and family-share premiums,150 in addition to competition among 
the plans offered, to control the risk. Whether premium caps will 
become bidding targets for plans or whether competition among 
plans will keep bids below the cap, is one of the major unknowns 
if the Clinton plan is adopted. From an antitrust perspective, it is 
clear that collusion among plans in the bidding process remains 
unlawful. On the other hand, the presence of a statutory method 
for setting price caps may be an invitation to make the cap the 
common bidding price without collusion.
The only explicit reference to the antitrust laws made in the Clinton 
proposal, Health'Security Act § 5501, is an amendment of the McCarran- 
Ferguson Act, providing:
(a) In General. Section 3 of the Act of March 9, 1945 (15 
U.S.C. 1013), known as the McCarran-Ferguson Act, is amended 
by adding at the end the following:
(c) Notwithstanding that the business of insurance is regulated 
by State law, nothing in this Act shall limit the applicability of the 
following Acts to the business of insurance to the extent that such 
business relates to the provision of health benefits:
(1) The Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.). |
(2) The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.).
(3) Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41jet seq.).
(4) The Act of June 19, 1936 (49 Stat. 1526; 15 U.S.C. 21a et 
seq.), known as the Robinsoii-Patman Antidiscrimination Act.
(b) Effective Date. The amendment made by subsection (a) 
shall take effect on the first day of the sixth month beginning after 
the date of the enactment of this Act.
. Section 1422 of the proposed Act prohibits tying the sale of a supple­
mental insurance plan to enrollment in a plan offered by a regional 
alliance.
149 Health Security Act, §§ 6000-6041.
150 Id. §§ 6101-6115.
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Other issues requiring* a sensitive and more explicit evaluation 
of the role of antitrust policy coexisting with the complex regula­
tory scheme involved in the Health Security Act need careful 
scrutiny if the cost of excessive antitrust litigation is to be mini­
mized. For example, what terms and conditions will be imposed 
to establish a provider group as a single entity rather than a col­
lection of independent providers fixing prices?151 What standards
1S1 Part 6 of the FTC and Antitrust Division Enforcement Policy 
Statements in the Health Care Area, supra note 124, defines a safety 
zone from antitrust review by the enforcement agencies (but not neces­
sarily private parties) for physician joint ventures with 20% or less of a 
specialty and states that those outside of the safety zone will be reviewed 
on a rule of reason basis. The formality of organization is not spelled out 
and there remains the risk of finding implied agreements among and 
between joint ventures and their members. On the issue of implied agree­
ments in health care, see, Anthony J. Dennis, Hospitals, Physicians, and 
Health Insurers: Guarding Against Implied Agreements in the Health 
Care Context, 71 W a sh . U. L.Q. 115 (1993). Senators Hatch and Thur­
mond have introduced a complex bill, S. 1658, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1993) in response to physician concerns about antitrust liability for joint 
action by physicians to bargain collectively with insurers. See Edward 
Felsenthal, Doctors Seek Easing of Antitrust Laws, W all St. J., Jan. 3, 
1994, at 12. The bill spells out in some detail the safety zone for doctor 
groups bargaining collectively with providers.
The Health Security Act, § 1203, delegates general authority to the 
states to certify plans without spelling out the legal structure of a plan; 
i.e., whether it must be in a corporate form or other legally recognized 
“person” for antitrust purposes.
At least for the fee-for-service plan, which must be offered by an 
alliance, specific mention of antitrust doctrine is made. Section 1322 of 
the Act authorizes states to set statewide fee for service schedules after 
negotiation with providers. Subsections (5) and (6) of § 1322 provide:
(5) Activities treated as State action or efforts intended to 
influence government action. The establishment of a fee schedule 
under this subsection by a regional alliance of a State shall be 
considered to be pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed State policy to displace competition and actively super­
vised by the State, and conduct by providers respecting the estab­
lishment of the fee schedule, including collective negotiations by 
providers with the regional alliance (or the State) pursuant to
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will be applied to determine membership in a provider group and 
who will have the power to both include and exclude members?152 
What constraints will be imposed upon the formation of provider 
groups and buyer groups with monopoly power?153 What limita-
paragraph (2), shall be considered as efforts intended to influence 
governmental action.
(6) No boycott permitted. Nothing in this subsection shall be 
construed to permit providers to threaten or engage in any boy­
cott.
152 The Health Security Act, § 1407 expressly authorizes plans to 
limit the number of providers belonging to the plan, requires enrollees in 
the plan to obtain services only from providers belonging to the plan and 
requires enrollees to receive specialized services from referrals made by 
participating providers in the jplan. Providers excluded from membership 
in a plan will no doubt look to antitrust and other remedies where plans 
exclude them from membership, see Winslow & Felsenthal, supra note 
38, at 1, or where membership in a plan forecloses membership in other 
plans. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589 (1st 
Cir. 1993) (holding that HMO employment contract offering doctors 
higher capitation payments in exchange for an agreement not to partici­
pate in other HMOs a lawful exclusive dealing contract, not a boycott).
While § 1407 of the Health Security Act preempts state laws prohibit­
ing the exclusion of providers from belonging to a particular plan, some 
states have already adopted laws prohibiting insurers from excluding 
providers willing to meet the requirements of their group plans. Such 
laws undermine the reason for having a group plan if providers outside 
the plan are free to offer service at prices provided for by the plan and 
state law requires that insurers sponsoring a plan pay the fees of non­
members abiding by the fees set. On the other hand, providers excluded 
from plans providing coverage for their patients will suffer a decline in 
income, and have been seeking various remedies for their plight. See 
Winslow & Fesenthal, supra note 38. The issue is a replay of the tradi­
tional battle between fee-for-service medicine and the shift to patients 
being bound to providers serving in their HMO, PPO or other form of 
collective practice.
153 In many parts of the country there is not a sufficient base to pro­
vide for three or more competitive supplier plans. See R. Kronick et al., 
The Marketplace in Health Care Reform: The Demographic Limitations 
of Managed Competition, 328 N ew  E n g . J. M e d . 148 (1993). The Health 
Security Act, §§ 1221-1224, authorizes the establishment of single-payor 
systems which might meet objections of an insufficient base from which
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tions will be imposed on hospitals and other providers merging or 
dividing up local product markets pursuant to state laws in lhe 
name of efficiency?154 What limitations will be imposed on the
to establish competing plans so long as fees are set by an independent 
state agency. The general requirements for a valid state single-payor sys­
tem are set forth in § 1222:
(1) Establishment by state. The system is established under 
State law, and State law provides for mechanisms to enforce the 
requirements of the plan.
(2) Operation by state. The system is operated by the State or 
a designated agency of the State.
(3) Enrollment of eligible individuals.
(A) Mandatory enrollment of all regional alliance individuals.
The system provides for the enrollment of all eligible individuals 
residing in the State (or, in the case of an alliance-specific 
single-payer system, in the alliance area) for whom the appli­
cable health plan would otherwise be a regional alliance health 
plan. . . . .
Extensive regulations are imposed on single-payor systems with regard to 
medicare, corporate alliance and other plan beneficiaries, as well as in 
the supervision of the state single-payor system. The regulations imposed 
would probably satisfy the state action exemption from the antitrust laws 
where they are effectively administered by independent state authority.
154 The Health Security Act does not deal explicitly with mergers and 
joint ventures among hospitals and health care providers other than to 
authorize 1-year exclusive dealing contracts between j'oint venture plans 
and consumers. The Antitrust Division and FTC statement of policy on 
mergers and j'dint ventures in health care, supra note 124 and accompa­
nying text, only explain the existing antitrust constraints on such activi­
ties. Neither agency, of course, is authorized to amend the antitrust laws 
or establish standards to govern court interpretation of the statutes in 
government or private actions.
There is an extensive merger movement among hospitals in anticipa­
tion of some form of “managed competition” legislation being adopted. 
See Anders, supra, note 116. Widespread excess capacity and the risk of 
being excluded from having an exclusive dealing contract with large 
insurance plans, poses a serious risk to unaffiliated hospitals incapable of 
providing full service to all members of a plan. On the other hand, many 
mergers may raise local concentration levels for acute care hospital serv­
ices well above the HHI index standards of the Merger Guidelines and 
pose serious enforcement questions for the FTC and Antitrust Division. 
Reform legislation should address the application of § 7 of the Clayton
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bargaining power of powerful buyer groups and powerful supplier 
groups to insure that they do not use that power to exclude com­
petitors, set artificially low or high prices or collude with com­
petitors in concentrated markets?155 What measures may be taken 
to insure that consumers locked into a particular HMO are not 
underserved in order to maximize the profits of the HMO or that 
the HMO will not take steps to minimize coverage of or exclude 
risky patients or expensive treatments?156
While the proposed Health Security Act has identified and 
sought to respond to some of these concerns,157 many of the reme­
dies for specific market failures lie with private bargaining (“man­
aged competition”) between plan sponsors and providers or within 
these groups. Such bargaining, however, must take place within 
the limits of the legal regime that defines the scope o f contract 
and property rights through basic laws like the state and federal 
antitrust laws. Tailoring this regulatory regime to the constraints 
of antitrust policy through legislation will be a challenging task—  
one of balancing the need for flexibility with the need to either 
constrain market failures and monopoly power with antitrust pol­
icy or by imposing some form of state or federal government 
affirmative regulation to curb the consequences of market fail­
ure.158 Doing so, while also avoiding the costs of a complex
Act to hospital and other health care mergers, and if the incipiency stan­
dard is relaxed, substitute some form of regulatory oversight for what 
may otherwise become monopoly power in providing local hospital serv­
ices by merged hospitals and hospital chains capable of supporting losses 
in one market from profits in another.
155 See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 
951 (10th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1991); Yao, supra 
note 138.
156 E nthoven , supra n o te  138, at 87-90.
157 See supra note 151.
158 If an express statutory exemption for joint action by buyers and 
prpviders is to be considered at the federal level, the closest existing 
analogies that might provide a guide for drafting an exemption are those 
for agricultural cooperatives and organized labor. See, e.g., Clayton Act,
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administrative bureaucracy to both negotiate constraints on mar­
ket failures or to oversee the bargaining process envisioned and 
the monopoly power that might be created, raises the further ques­
tion of whether there might be a cheaper and less complex alterna­
tive.159 .
§ 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (exempting formation of labor, agricultural and horti­
cultural organizations “for the purpose of mutual help”); The Capper 
Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (authorizing agricultural associations 
to engage in joint marketing subject to regulation for monopolization by 
the Secretary of Agriculture); Clayton Act § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (prohibit­
ing injunctions in labor disputes “concerning terms and conditions of 
employment”); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10 (protecting 
unilateral actions of labor and management in pursuit of their own goals 
from injunctions).
These exemptions were enacted in light of the unique characteristics 
of the activities involved and in light of the need to equalize bargaining 
power in what would be otherwise unequal bargaining circumstances. For 
an analysis of the exemptions, see, Rh illip  A r eed a , .1 A n titr u st  L aw 
178-188 (agricultural exemption) & 188-222 (labor exemption) (1978); 
L ouis B. S chw artz  et a l ., supra note 14, at 394-96 (agricultural exemp­
tion) & 1070-1165 (labor exemption). A managed competition system 
for regulating health care might also require an exemption authorizing 
limited joint buyer and seller conduct to equalize bargaining power 
through joint ventures, mergers or collective bargaining by otherwise 
independent competitors. Authority to control competitive abuses of the 
exemption, however, should be lodged in the Antitrust Division and the 
FTC rather than some specialized agency to minimize the risk of “regula­
tory capture” by powerful forces aligned on one or the other side of the 
market.
159 One serious criticism of the Clinton proposal is that it would 
appear to add to the administrative bureaucracy presently plaguing health 
care. Gregg Easterbrook has observed: “In the name of cutting bureau­
cratic waste in health care Clinton proposes to abolish nothing, while ere- 
ating an entirely new level of overhead in the form of large 
health-purchasing alliances; establishing the new National Health Board; 
and creating as many as 50 separate systems of medical care, since each 
state is to be free to devise its own approach to health administration.
“Excessive overhead is already the bane of American medicine, with 
studies estimating administrative expenses at around 20 percent of U.S. 
health care costs or a stunning $168 billion in 1992—-more than France 
and Germany combined spent of their entire health care systems in that
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The principal alternative many advocate to managed competi­
tion is the Canadian system for fi&ijselng health care. In Canada, 
the basic reform was to socialize insurance, but not the practice of 
medicine, by making provincial^ governments the primary third- 
party payor insuring all citizensW Canada. The provincial gov­
ernments regulate the discretion on fifcvidcrs to charge what the 
traffic will bear by negotiation with provider groups.160 The sys­
tem is paid for through a series of provincial and federal taxes, 
much like our social security and welfare systems are financed. 
This reform achieves universal access, while leaving consumers 
free to select their own health care provider and method of treat­
ment within the constraints of the limitations upon the negotiated 
plan and the willingness of providers to supply services at the pre­
determined price. Doctors and other health care professionals are 
not made employees of the government and practice much as they 
do in this country, although there are province-mandated limits on 
charges for services (maximum rate regulation) and prohibitions 
on billing patients for any balance of the cost of providing them 
service over and above the government-negotiated fee. Proponents 
of this approach claim a major advantage over a managed compe­
tition approach is the minimizing of administrative overheads 
estimated by some to constitute 20% to 25% of total health care 
costs of the present system in the United States.161 A single payor 
system, rather than a complex bargaining process by multiple pri­
y e a r .” Major Surgery for Clinton's Health Care Plan, W a sh . P ost W. 
Ed., Oct 4-10,1993, at 25.
160 For reviews of the Canadian system see Marmor & Barr, supra 
note 135; Robert G. Evans, The Canadian Health-Care Financing and 
Delivery System: Its Experience and Lessons for Other Nations, 10 Y ale  
L. & P o l ’y  R e v . 362 (1992); Kaplan, A Legal Perspective on National 
Health Insurance: Current Issues in Canada’s Program, 9 Wis. In t ’l LJ. 
515(1991).
161 See Eric Eckholm, Study Links Paperwork to 25% o f Hospital 
Costs, N.Y. T im es , Aug. 5, 1993, at A3; Robert G. Evans, Tension, Com­
pression, and Shear: Directions, Stresses, and Outcomes o f Health Care 
Cost Control, 15 J. H ealth  P ol . P q l ’y  & L. 101, 115 (1990); Marmor & 
Barr, supra note 135, at 232-33.
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vate parties and ongoing administration of the managed competi­
tion system by the parties and government, it is argued, would 
minimize what have become large administrative overheads.162
One overhead cost not often counted by proponents of the 
Canadian system is the cost of the method adopted for setting 
fees.163 Fees $re set through negotiation in each province between 
the provincial government and the provincial medical association. 
Fees are lower than in the United States although the volume pro­
vided by universal coverage and accessibility can make up for the 
lost physician income due to reduced fees for each procedure.164 
Consumers are free to select their own physician. With almost
162 Evans, supra note 160, at 377-82. Among the costs avoided by a 
single-payor system are costs of monitoring competing private insurers 
and market failures like HMOs trying to escape insuring high-risk appli­
cants in favor of maximizing profits. Tn addition, the current system of 
multiple insurers each using their own billing systems has created a 
paperwork nightmare. It is reported, for example, the Johns Hopkins Hos­
pital is required to keep track of 18,000 different charge categories for 
500 different insurance plans that pay bills for patients at the hospital. 
Billing procedures at the hospital are estimated to cost $13 million per 
year. W a sh . P ost N a t ’l  W eekly , Ed., May 17-23,1993, at 9.
163 In th e  U n ited  S ta te s  w e  hav e  had  a p p ro x im a te ly  10 y e a rs  o f  e x p e ­
r ie n c e  w ith  p ro sp e c tiv e  fee  se ttin g  u n d e r  M e d ic a re  and the  e s ta b lish m e n t 
o f  D R G s sp e c ify in g  fe e s  fo r  sp e c if ic  tre a tm e n ts  ren d e re d  in d iv id u a ls . See 
L o u is  B. S c h w a r tz  e t  a l . ,  F re e  E n te r p r is e  a n d  E co n o m ic  O rg a n iz a t io n :  
G o v e rn m e n t R e g u la t io n  591 et seq. (6 th  ed . 1985). F o r a c r it ic a l e m p ir i­
c a l re v ie w  o f  th e  p ro g ra m , see D av id  F ra n k fo rd , The Medicare DRGs: 
Efficiency and Organizational Rationality, 10 Y a le  J. R e g . 273 (1993).
164 Physicians in Canada continue to earn high salaries ranging in 
British Columbia from an average of $300,000 for cardiologists, to 
$240,000 for ophthalmologists, to $128,000 for general practitioners. 
Robert G. Evans, Health Care in Canada: Patterns of Funding and Regu­
lation, 8 J. H ealth  P o l ’y & L. 1 (1983). A recent survey in the United 
States estimated the average yearly earnings of cardiovascular surgeons 
at $574,769; diagnostic radiologists at $309,556; anesthesiologists at 
$253,511; and family practitioners at $119,166. See Eric Eckholm, 
Health Plan Is Toughest on Doctors Making Most, N.Y. T im es , Nov. 7, 
1993, at 1.
50% of Canadian physicians engaged in family practice, as com­
pared to-13% to 30%, depending on how one counts, in the United 
States, there is competition in Canada for providing family service 
and less of a tendency for patients to go to specialists first. Fam­
ily physicians in turn, assume the primary responsibility for refer­
ring patients to specialists when needed.
Under the Canadian system there is also substantial govern­
ment involvement in decisions to build additional hospital capac­
ity and coordination of the purchase of expensive equipment, 
additional regulatory expenses not often counted by proponents of 
the system. Hospitals negotiate with provincial governments for 
an annual operating budget and through this mechanism, the gov­
ernment is able to control the building or retention of excess 
capacity, the acquisition of unnecessary and duplicative equip­
ment and the pressure on hospitals to specialize in every possible 
procedure. Since government funding provides 95% of a hospi­
tal’s funds in Canada, control of those purse strings can be used to 
prevent actions like those we see in many places in the United 
States—building more and more bed space when some hospitals 
are operating at 60% or less of capacity, the buying of expensive 
equipment duplicating that at other facilities, and trying to spe­
cialize in everything to compete with other hospitals doing the 
same. l
If merger and monopolization regulation are to be reduced in 
the health care field by adopting the Canadian approach to financ­
ing and regulation, a complex issue of how hospital rates will be 
set must be confronted. States are beginning to enact legislation 
authorizing hospitals and other health care facilities to enter into 
“cooperative agreements” with other hospitals and facilities “for 
the sharing, allocation or referral of patients, personnel, instruc­
tional programs, support services and facilities or medical, diag­
nostic and laboratory services or procedures or other services.”165
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i
165 22 M. R e v . S tat . A n n . § 1882 (1991). North Dakota adopted simi­
lar legislation in the spring of 1993. See 65 ATRR (BNA) No. 1622, at 
63 (July 8, 1993). State Certificate of F^ eed (CON) laws can be used to
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This specific authorization for local hospitals to divide markets in 
the name of avoiding a costly competitive race duplicating facili­
ties, specialties and equipment has much to commend it if one 
ignores the monopolistic potential of such arrangements. Simply 
authorizing the conduct without objective and ongoing supervi­
sion of the arrangement and the prices charged by the participants 
would obviously not meet the requirements of the state action 
exemption from the antitrust laws. One must confront the further 
question that if this kind of exemption for clearly per se illegal 
conduct is to be sanctioned, whether it must be accompanied by 
the further step of affirmative rate regulation of the activity in 
question where the market division creates a monopoly or unrea­
sonable restraint of trade. If affirmative rate regulation is to 
be adopted, the form of rate regulation—cost of service, value of 
service, operating ratios, or some other method—that would be 
the preferred system of rate regulation in such circumstances must 
also be addressed.
Adoption of the Canadian approach in the United States is still 
a possibility although politically legs likely than is the adoption of 
some version of managed competition.166 If the Canadian system 
is adopted in the United States—and the administrative costs of 
the existing system and the costs and complexity of the proposed 
Health Security Act may drive us to it—considerable thought 
would have to be given to the establishment of a mechanism for 
setting fees of doctors, hospitals, and related activities, and how 
these price-setting mechanisms would relate to antitrust policy. If 
done by the federal or state governments, the challenge of estab­
control the proliferation of hospital programs in order to provide across « 
the board services in light of likelihood that there will $e group purchase 
of service on a fixed fee basis. See Blood Feud—Heart-Surgery Battle in 
Michigan Is Struggle Over Cost, Care, Profit, W all  S t . J., May 24, 
1993, at 1 (CON regulation used to preclude establishment of new open 
heart surgery facilities; state has 28 hospitals offering the service and no. 
need of additional facilities).
166 See Hilary Stout & David Rogers, ‘Single Payer’ Concept for 
Health-Care Plan Is Alive and Well Despite Downgrading by Clinton, 
W all  St. J., Dec. 31, 1993, at 32.
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lishing specific fees for the hundreds of different services and pro­
cedures available without undue damage to the allocation of 
resources and innovation, may be overwhelming. We have experi­
ence with establishing fees for Medicare Diagnosis Related 
Groups (DRGs),167 but would no longer have the flexibility of 
cross-subsidizing mistakes in setting DRG prices by raising prices 
in the third-party insured fee-for-service market.
While adoption of the Canadian system does offer the attrac­
tions of minimizing administrative costs and retaining freedom df 
patient choice, it must also be recognized that it suffers from rely­
ing upon a maximum price-fixing regime to control fees where 
maximum fees will likely become minimum ones; it requires the 
establishment of a centralized decision-ihaking regime on how 
resources are to be allocated among different medical procedures 
and over capital investment decisions; and, it may impact seri­
ously upon a central goal of antitrust policy—the stimulation of 
innovation. .
In addition, adoption of the Canadian system would raise com­
plex issues for integrating antitrust policy with the details of the 
plan adopted. For example, if family practitioners are to be relied 
upon as gatekeepers to control access to specialists, what antitrust 
standards will be applicable to the exercise of this discretion? To 
what extent will mergers of hospitals and other health care facili­
ties be permitted where government is setting a cap on hospital 
fees and regulating hospital expansion and equipment acquisi­
tions? To what degree will providers be permitted to band together 
to negotiate the terms and conditions of fees and to what extent 
will joint conduct be permitted to spill over into other areas of 
competitive concerns like credentialing and peer review? It is in 
the details and practical operation of the plan that difficult 
antitrust and regulatory alternative issues must be anticipated and 
provided for before legislation adopting some form of “managed
167 For an overview of the use of prospective rate setting on an aver­
age cost basis used in setting fees for DRGs, see Louis B. S c h w a r tz  e t  
a l . , supra note 163, at 591-609; Frankford, supra note 163.
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competition” or the Canadian single payor system can be made 
final.168 .
IV. Conclusion
Antitrust policy is not in need of resuscitation when it comes 
to the health care industry. It is in need of being more consistently 
used, not just for litigation purposes,' but for purposes of deter­
mining which health care financing system and activities ought to 
be affirmatively regulated in lieu of antitrust policy and how best 
to implement the regulation found necessary. Health care is an 
industry that has too long been immune from rigorous review on 
fundamental legal and economic grounds, a fact for which we are 
now paying a heavy price in both extensive litigation and a major 
legislative effort to restructure the entire industry. The complexi­
ties of sorting out which road to follow in reforming health care 
are in large part due to the fact that the industry has evolved with­
out being subject to serious and consistent antitrust or regulatory 
review. Anticompetitive practices and structures have evolved in 
the context of third-party payment on a fee-for-service basis, 
embedding in the public mind a right of access to health care 
services without realizing the ultimate individual responsibility to 
pay for them. Health care practitioners have also been operating 
on the assumption that they will be reimbursed without regard for 
the cost of what they do for the patient and without regard for the 
costs of the exercise of their discretion in determining a course of 
care. It is an industry structure and pattern of behavior that soci­
ety has finally concluded we can no longer afford and one that 
must be reformed. And, it is an industry now in the course of
168 There are other models from which the United States health care 
reform may borrow. See, e.g., Kirkman-Liff, Physician Payment and. 
Cost Containment Strategies in West Germany: Suggestions for Medical 
Reform, 15 J. H ealth  P o l . P o l ’y & L. 69 (1990); Dukakis* Hawaii and 
Massachusetts: Lessons from the States, 10 Y a le  L. & P o l ’y R e v . 397 
(1992); Garland, Light on the Black Box of Basic Health Care: Oregon’s 
Contribution to the National Movement Towards Universal Health Insur­
ance, 10 Y ale  L. & P o l ’y R ev . 409 (1992).
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change as all concerned search for a new industry financing 
mechanism and standards for behavior capable of delivering serv­
ice to all efficiently and fairly, without undue compromise of 
quality and innovation.
The goals of antitrust policy provide a guiding light for both 
suggesting paths of reform and measuring the wisdom of the 
reforms proposed, including the wisdom and consequences of any 
affirmative regulation that may be proposed in lieu of antitrust 
enforcement to address areas of market failure. Antitrust and affir­
mative regulation are not two incompatible regimes, but constitute 
two different means for achieving and insuring the common eco­
nomic, social and political objectives gained by subjecting eco­
nomic activity to a competitive process or government regulation 
seeking to mimic the consequences of a competitive process 
where competition is not possible.169 Leaving the industry and 
reform proposals to continue along a path of no accountability to 
the political, social and economic goals sought by antitrust policy 
and responsible affirmative regulation is a solution we have been 
following for too many decades in health care and one that has 
created the plight we now find ourselves in. Finding the right mix 
of market and regulatory remedies is the great challenge of health 
care reform and one that may well take, and should take, decades 
to resolve in light of the complexities of the issues.
The proposals pending before Congress provide contrasting 
beginning points to the debate. While the Clinton administration 
deserves credit for the great strides that have been made in secur­
ing consensus on universal access, requiring cost containment and 
the need for legislative reform of financing methods foi health 
care, neither the Health Security Act nor any of the other plans 
proposed to date appear to address adequately the details of how 
antitrust and regulatory policy should fashion reform and govern 
the future operation of the health care delivery system. The one
169 Modem rationales for imposing affirmative government regulation 
on an industry or activity are summarized in Louis B. S c h w a r t z  et  a l ., 
supra note 163, at 64-66.
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alternative society cannot afford is reform that allows the industry 
to escape accountability to the social, political and economic 
goals of antitrust policy whether they are to be realized by 
reliance upon a competitive process or by the imposition of an 
affirmative regulatory process seeking to achieve the goals 
antitrust enforcement and responsible regulation secure by main­
taining or mimicking a competitive process. If Congress does not 
expressly address the issue of securing these goals by affirmative 
regulation in the areas of health care financing, peer review and 
credentialing, pricing for services, exclusive dealing, tying and 
mergers, the courts will be left with the complex task of reconcil­
ing antitrust policy with the ambiguities of whatever system is 
adopted. While the incomes of antitrust and regulatory lawyers 
may benefit, consumers, the industry, health care reform, antitrust 
policy and the courts will not be served well by such a state of 
affairs.
